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THE EFFECT OF REWARD AND PUNISHMENT ON FIGURE-GROUND PERCEPTION 
AS A FUNCTION OF DEMAND CHARACTERISTICS AND 
PSYCHOLOGICAL SOPHISTICATION OF SUBJECTS
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Schafer and Murphy (1943) attempted to experimentally demonstrate 
that a history of reward and punishment would modify perception, particu­
larly in an ambiguous situation. On several training trials, one aspect 
of a reversible figure, presented tachistoscopically, was contiguously 
paired with the winning of a small amount of money (reward) while the 
other aspect was paired with the loss of money (punishment). In a test 
situation, when the complete ambiguous or reversible figure was presented, 
subjects reported seeing the rewarded aspect of the figure more often than 
the punished aspect. This result was taken as strong evidence for the 
hypothesis that reward and punishment can determine what is seen as figure 
and what is seen as ground.
In more recent times, investigators of verbal conditioning have 
been concerned with the problem of subjects becoming aware of the purpose 
of the experiment and this in turn eliciting cooperation (®ulany, 1961; 
Levin, 1961; Spielberger, 1962; Farber, 1963; Page, 1964). Findings of 
learning and awareness experiments strongly suggest that operant verbal
1
2conditioning such as originally reported by Greenspoon (1955) and the 
classical conditioning of meaning reported by Staats and Staats (1957) 
occurs only in subjects who can correctly verbalize the purpose of the 
experiment. So far, these studies have been limited to verbal conditioning. 
However, the same problem could exist in other experiments, particularly 
when deception is involved.
Orne (1962) has approached the same problem of subjects aware 
nesses in experiments as a part of a more general concern with the social 
psychology of the psychological experiment. He has suggested that what a 
subject perceives as the purpose of the experiment be called the demand 
characteristics of the experiment. According to Orne, such demand char­
acteristics can be very important in mediating the behavior observed in
psychological experiments. Demand characteristics artifacts place severe
*
limitations upon the generalizability of data obtained in certain artificial 
laboratory situations.
In view of the substantial empirical literature which is accumulat­
ing with regard to the importance of awareness in verbal conditioning and 
the contemporary concern with the social psychology of experiments, it seem­
ed appropriate to re-examine the Schafer-Murphy effect. While Schafer and 
Murphy's experiment was concerned with perceptual learning, their procedures 
resemble those used by Staats and Staats. If the Schafer-Murphy effect were 
also found to be an artifact of subjects becoming aware of the purpose of 
the experiment, this would represent an extension of the problem into an 
area where investigators h^ve not previously considered the possibility 
of awareness artifacts.
The present dissertation presents the results of an experimental 
study of the Schafer-Murphy effect in terms of subjects awarenesses or
3the demand characteristics of the experiment. The general hypothesis is 
that the Schafer-Murphy effect is an artifact of demand characteristics. 
Specific predictions derived from this hypothesis will be spelled out 
later. If this hypothesis were confirmed, it would be of particular in­
terest because the Schafer-Murphy experiment is a classic study that appears 
in many general and social psychology textbooks.
The "Autism" And Figure-Ground Experiment
In the 1940's, Gardner Murphy directed a series of studies de­
signed to experimentally demonstrate his theory of "autism" (Levin, Chein,
& Murphy, 1942; Proshansky & Murphy, 1942; Schafer & Murphy, 1943). Per­
ceptual "autism" was defined as the organization of cognitive processes 
in the direction of need satisfaction. A major hypothesis was that a 
history of reward and punishment would influence perception, particularly 
in an ambiguous situation.
Schafer and Murphy (1943) gave a small amount of money (two and 
four cents) as rewards and took money away as punishment. Four training 
stimuli were presented 25 times each in a tachistoscope at a 1/3 second 
exposure speed. They consisted on contour lines drawn on the flat side 
of a half circle so that they appeared as faces or profiles (see Figure 1). 
These profiles were actually pairs which shared the same contour line when 
they were fit together in a complete circle (see Figure 2). For some of 
the subjects, the right half of one reversible contour was rewarded (won 
money)and the left half of the other (N-D order), while the other halves 
were punished (lost money). The other subjects received reward and pun­
ishment in the opposite order (B-C order), to control for position and 
contour effects. After 100 training trials (25 for each face) of consistent
#Figure 1. Examples of two of the four profiles presented in the training 
series by Schafer and Murphy (1943).
Figure 2. Example of one of the two reversible figures used by Schafer 
and Murphy (1943) in the post-training series.
5reward for two faces and consistent punishment for the other two faces, 
a test series was initiated. During the test, the pairs of stimuli which 
shared the same contour line were presented.together in a circle. The 
hypothesis was that subjects would see more rewarded profiles than punished 
ones in the ambiguous situation. No rewards or punishments were given 
during testing. The subjects were told they would now see the faces in­
side a circle, and they were to report what they saw. A total of 32 test 
trials were given. Between test trials, a nonreversible contour in a 
circle facing in the opposite direction from the subject's last response 
was presented. This was to break up the formation of directional sets in 
perceiving the reversible figures. For the first 16 trials, the hypothesis 
was strongly supported. About 80 percent of the test responses were to the 
rewarded figures and 20 percent to the punished figures. After 16 test 
trials, the response broke down and the authors invoke the concepts of ex­
tinction and learning of new directional sets to account for this. Though 
Schafer and Murphy used only five subjects, there appeared to be striking 
evidence for an effect of reward and punishment on subsequent figure- 
ground perception.
Rock and Fleck (1950) attempted to replicate the Schafer-Murphy 
experiment, using high school students as subjects. They used a projector 
type tachistoscope instead of the Whipple tachistoscope used in the earlier 
study. Considerable individual differences were found, but these tended to 
cancel out to produce an overall insignificant result. They did introduce 
a post-experimental interview which was very suggestive. Many of their sub­
jects reported seeing both faces in the ambiguous test series, but responded 
with only one name.
6Subjects in the Rock and Fleck study made many more incorrect 
identifications in the test series than did Schafer and Murphy's sub­
jects. This suggested to Jackson (1954) that there was something 
different between the stimuli of the two experiments. He noted that 
Rock and Fleck had used a projector tachistoscope which projected a large 
image on a screen while Schafer and Murphy had used a tachistoscope which 
cast a small image and had a constantly lighted field. Consequently he 
felt that a replication using both kinds of apparatus was appropriate. 
Using a tachistoscope similar to Schafer and Murphy's, he replicated 
their results. Using a projector tachistoscope, he obtained results that 
were statistically reliable, but less pronounced. Like Rock and Fleck, 
he obtained a high proportion of incorrect identifications. Jackson con­
cluded that Rock and Fleck had failed to replicate because their apparatus 
made the stimuli too difficult to see and not because the Schafer-Murphy 
effect could not be replicated.
Jackson introduced a modification of the reward and punishment 
procedure, but apparently this did not affect the results. In the 
Schafer-Murphy study, rewards and punishments were ostensibly contingent 
upon the subjects guessing certain numbers while, actually, two profiles 
were always rewarded and two were always punished. In the Jackson study, 
the guessing was left out and the rewards and punishments were given 
directly. The Jackson procedure has been predominantly used in more re­
cent work on the Schafer-Murphy effect.
Jackson presented individual data for his 12 subjects. It is in­
teresting to note that only four of the subjects had high proportions of 
rewarded responses to both of the reversible test stimuli; two others had 
high proportions of rewarded responses for one of the test stimuli, but
7about equal proportions of rewarded and punished responses to the other 
test stimuli. It could be argued that only four of the subjects were 
motivated by the money and therefore were the only ones who's perception 
was modified by the training. This argument does not hold, however, for 
the two who learned the response for only one of the two possible ambiguous 
stimuli because rewards and punishments were equal for both sets of stimuli. 
If some cognitive process, such as awareness of the experimenter's hypothe­
sis, were operating in this situation, it is reasonable that subjects aware 
of one contingency would respond to that contingency. One subject respond-
ed maximally in the opposite direction from the hypothesis for one of the
pairs. This may have been resistance behavior similar to that found in 
verbal conditioning. The other five subjects, as a group, balance out at 
about equal responses for the rewarded and punished figures. Three of 
these five had a very high proportion of mistaken identifications in the 
test series (about 50 percent). It is probable that these subjects could 
not recognize the stimuli during training as well as the others. If so, 
then it is less likel-y that they would have become aware.
Jackson's data fits very well with what would be predicted if the
same mechanisms were working in his experiment as those to be described 
later in the section on verbal conditioning and awareness, expecially if 
Jackson's subjects could often see both faces in the test series as sug­
gested by Smith and Hochberg's (1954) second experiment.
Smith and Hochberg (1954) replicated the Schafer-Murphy effect 
using solid figures rather than outlines and using electric shock as 
punishment. They found a significant preference for the non-shocked
figures in the test series, but considerable individual variation. Their
%
apparatus resembled that used by Rock and Fleck (1950). A second
8experiment attempted to relate the phenomenon to subception and perceptual 
defense. However, it was found that at 1/3 second exposure, both figures 
could often be identified when the subject was given the set to do so.
They concluded that explanations that did not invoke prerecognition pro­
cesses such as subception were more adequate. It is interesting to note 
that both figures could often be perceived. Such a finding supports a 
demand characteristics interpretation because it suggests that subjects 
may have often seen both figures but chose to report the rewarded figure 
because of demand characteristics. A demonstration of autism would re­
quire subjects to see only one figure.
The Schafer-Murphy design was psed as the prototype for an ex-
,■
tensive research program on perceptual learning at the Menninger Foundation 
in the late 1950's. Snyder and Snyder (1956) modified the Schafer-Murphy 
design in order to study the effects of monetary reward and punishment on 
the auditory modality. When a rewarded voice and a punished voice were 
presented at the same time, subjects tended to attend more to the rewarded 
voice. A brief post-experimental interview was conducted, though what was 
asked was not reported. The authors indicate that seven of their 41 sub­
jects reported awareness. The importance of this is dismissed, however, 
because all of the between groups variance is not accounted for by these 
seven subjects. The present discussion of verbal conditioning will point 
out that brief interviews typically do not detect all of the aware sub­
jects and this, in turn, could account for Snyder and Snyder's results.
Two studies used the Schafer-Murphy design to influence the per­
ception of Figure-ground through the tactual modality (Sommer & Ayllon, 
1956; Ayllon & Sommer, 1956) with significant results. Several other 
Menninger Foundation studies used children as subjects. Earlier studies
(Solley & Sommer, 1957; Solley & Engel, 1960) found strong autism effects 
using the Schafer-Murphy profiles and also some other ambiguous figures.
A later study (Santos & Garvin, 1962) done by different experimenters, 
but also from the Menninger Foundation, failed to obtain the effect. These 
authors are skeptical about the generalizability of the Schafer-Murphy effect 
and suggest that certain uncontrolled variables, such as the relationship 
between experimenter and subject may be important. However, their fail­
ure to obtain the effect is inconclusive because of several significant 
departures from previous methodology.
A study by Solley and Santos (1958) used operant verbal reinforce­
ment of a reversible Meeker Cube. During 256 trials, a Meeker Cube improved 
to favor a left to right perception was presented 101 times and a cube 
biased for right to left perception was presented 101 times. One of the 
improved cubes received 70 percent positive verbal reinforcement ("good" 
or "fine") while the other received only 30 percent. A balanced or re­
versible test cube was presented 54 times, interspersed among the training 
trials. For most subjects, there developed a preference for perceiving 
the reversible cube in the most often reinforced direction. Some subjects 
developed no preference at all. The interview for awareness was apparent­
ly not stressed as it is dismissed in a sentence. The authors make one 
statement that is interesting from a demand characteristic viewpoint:
It should be pointed out again that three subjects were not 
included because they reached a point in conditioning where they 
reported the reinforced aspect of the cube even when being shown 
the non-reinforced improved opposite!
These subjects were eliminated from the analysis because their behavior
did not make sense from the experimenter's point of view. But, from the
e,
point of view of the subjects doing what the demand characteristics of 
the situation call for, their behavior makes a good deal of sense.
10
The Solley and Santos (1958) experiment, along with a discussion 
of it by Santos and Murphy (1960), suggests that the thinking of the 
Menninger Foundation group was very similar to that found in early verbal 
conditioning studies. Reinforcement or punishment is the key to modifying 
behavior even when the subject is not aware of the contingency between re­
inforcement and his behavior. Sheer contiguity of a pleasant or unpleasant 
affect (produced by reward and punishment) with a perceptual stimulus, 
modifies the figure-ground properties of that stimulus when it is later 
presented in an ambiguous form. This happens regardless of what the re-
C'/
ward might mean to the subject (i.e. I get rewarded for guessing the correct 
number), so long as it is contiguous with the stimulus. The subject is ap­
parently viewed as a passive agent. He may be deceived and given incomplete 
information without any of it making much difference as long as the reward 
is presented at the same time as the perceptual stimulus. What the subject 
is aware of is of little importance, therefore a meager effort, if any, is 
made to find out about awareness.
In light of the learning and awareness findings to which we now 
turn, subjects' awareness may be extremely important in the Schafer- 
Murphy situation. A careful and extensive effort should be made to find 
out what these awarenesses might have been because it is likely that these 
awarenesses can account for most, if not all, of the systematic variance 
in the Schafer-Murphy experiment.
Verbal Conditioning And Awareness 
Operant verbal conditioning has been attempted using several 
different procedures. The most often used procedures are those of 
Greenspoon (1955), which involves subjects saying words or numbers over
11
an extended time while being "reinforced" for saying words of a certain 
class by the experimenter saying "good" or "Urn hum," and Taffel (1955), 
which involves subjects constructing a series of sentences using verbs 
printed on stimulus cards and being reinforced for beginning their sen­
tences with certain pronouns. Subjects in these situations typically 
emitted more responses in the reinforced category that did control sub­
jects who received no verbal reinforcement. Subjects who verbalized 
awareness in a brief post-experimental interview were usually eliminated 
from the analysis so that the results could be attributed to an S-R 
bond independent of higher cognitive processes.
Tatz (1960) was concerned that Dollard and Miller (1950) had 
interpreted Greenspoon's (dissertation in 1950, published 1955) results 
as supporting Thorndike's hypothesis of the direct action of rewards 
(i.e. law of effect). He felt that this interpretation depended upon 
the assumption that "awareness" was absent. Previous investigators 
had taken into account only subjects who could specifically state the 
experimenter's system for allotting reinforcement. According to Tatz, 
the problem was more complex: Earlier investigators had not taken into
account "partially correct response systems," which could mediate a level 
of performance higher than chance even though they did not correspond ex­
actly to the experimenter's systetti for allotting reinforcements. He 
obtained awareness protocols post-experimentally. Subjects were then 
classified into one of four groups, (1) stated the system, (2) stated 
a successful system, (3) stated a partially successful system, and (4) 
stated no effective system. When the correlated response hypotheses 
as well as correct ones were taken into account, no evidence was found 
for verbal conditioning in truly unaware subjects.
12
Dulany (1961, 1962) felt that verbal conditioning had attracted 
attention only because : it apparently demonstrated learning without 
awareness in some sense. He was unsurprised to learn that one can in­
fluence the actions of another cooperative human being by informing him 
that his behavior is judged correct or acceptable, but the claim that this 
occurred outside of awareness could have alternative explanations. It is 
possible, he said, that the operant conditioning effect was mediated by 
some kind of verbal control, i.e. behavioral hypotheses and self instruction­
al sets.
Dulany replicated Greenspoon's experiment, except that he stopped 
subjects after each 55 responses and asked: "What do you think the ex­
periment is all about?" After the experiment he asked further questions.
Not one subject stated that plural nouns were correct (Greenspoon's cri­
terion for eliminating awares). There was evidence that the experimental 
group said more plural nouns than did the controls. However, of his 43 
experimental subjects, 11 said that when the experimenter said, "Urn hum" 
it meant they were to associate in the same category. Most of them also 
said that when he stopped saying "Um hum" it meant they were to change 
categories. Subjects (N=32) who did not hold these behavioral hypotheses 
showed no conditioning effect at all. Dulany then did a word association 
experiment which showed a strong tendency for subjects instructed to 
associate in the same category to associate plural words with plural 
stimuli. Therefore, if subjects acted upon the behavioral hypothesis 
they reported in his first experiment, they should have increased their 
output of plural nouns.
Dulany suggests that "a correct behavioral hypothesis" be used
as a theoretical term for awareness that relates to response selection
*
13
in experiments. Further, he suggests that "correlated hypothesis" be
'
used for "incorrect" awareness that correlates with what the experimenter 
calls correct. In his experiments he has found no evidence for verbal 
conditioning in subjects not having either correct or correlated response 
hypotheses.
Farber (1963) also reports difficulty in finding evidence for 
verbal conditioning in unaware subjects. In an article entitled, "The 
Things People Say to Themselves," he reports a study where aware sub­
jects are classified as conforming or nonconforming. Conforming aware 
showed high conditioning, nonconforming awares showed less conditioning 
and unawares showed no conditioning. Farber says that one might reason­
ably argue that subjects who learned, became aware because they learned, 
but that it would be pushing credulity too far to suppose that subjects 
statements concerning conformity did not indicate planned action. As an 
example of what he meant by planned action, he lists several verbal re­
ports given by his subjects. One of them was; "Everytime I said 'you', 
he said 'good' so naturally I said 'you' most of the time, but now and 
then I said something else to break the monotony."
Levin (1961) and Spielberger (1962) have emphasized the dif­
ferences in brief and extended post-experimental interviews in detecting 
aware subjects. , They have found that brief and unstructured interviews 
frequently do not elicit reports of awareness for subjects while more 
^structured and specific questions do. Their findings strongly support 
the contention that undetected aware subjects who respodd at a high rate, 
account for all of the systematic variance in operant-verbal conditioning. 
Also, previous studies did not initiate awareness interviews until ^pter 
extinction procedures. This could have caused aware subjects to discount
^  •'
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their earlier response hypotheses before they were asked concerning their 
awareness.
Recently, Page (1964) and Letchworth (1965) have extended the im­
plications of the awareness findings in operant verbal conditioning to 
include the classical conditioning of meaning experiments introduced by 
Staats and Staats (1957, 1958). Using the extended post-experimental
interview technique, they have founA^that results leading to the inference
A
of verbal classical conditioning of meaning appear also to be an artifact 
of subjects becoming aware of the purpose of the experiment.
Staats and Staats (1957) introduced their experiment to the sub­
jects as a study of the simultaneous learning of visually and orally 
presented words. First, there was a conditioning series where two words, 
connotatively neutral on Osgood's evaluative dimension (Osgood, Suci, & 
Tannenbaum, 1957), were each presented visually 18 times. One word was 
always paired with orally presented words having a heavy loading of 
pleasant evaluative meaning while the other was always paired with un­
pleasant words. To make the deception more plausible, four other visual 
words were also presented randomly 18 times each; but these were paired 
with spoken words having no consistent connotative meaning. A seven- 
point semantic differential scale of pleasant-unpleasant was introduced 
after the conditioning procedure to test for the acquisition of the con- 
ditioned evaluative response to the two experimental words. The stated 
purpose of this was "to see if how we feel about words affects how we 
learn them" (Staats & Staats, 1957). The deceptions were then carried 
through by giving a learning test. Finally, subjects were asked to
write down what they thought about the experiment, especially it's pur- 
K
pose. Subjects who stated the correct relationship between the experimental
15
words and the loaded words were considered "aware" and were eliminated 
from the analysis. The remaining data revealed a significant difference 
between the mean semantic differential ratings of the two previously 
neutral experimental words. No such change took place for the four con­
trol words. This effect was attributed to conditioning of meaning without 
awareness.
In replications focusing on the assessment of awareness in the 
above studies (Page, 1964; Letchworth, 1965), behavior similar to that 
reported in operant verbal conditioning was found. Some subjects ap­
parently saw through the deceptions and noticed one or both of the 
relationships between the visual words and the loaded spoken words.
They also correctly guessed that they were to respond in a certain way 
when conditioning was tested with the semantic differential. Most of 
these "aware" subjects responded by marking the critical words at the 
extreme ends of the seven-point scale. When asked to explain their re­
sponses, they typically said: "I thought that was what I was supposed 
to do; isn't that what you were trying to get me to do?" These subjects 
were called cooperators. Certain other subjects also verbalized aware­
ness of the correct experimental contingency, but did not indicate it in 
their rating responses. In the post-experimental interview, these sub-
fjects said they tried to resist the association the experimenter was 
attempting to form. These subjects were called resistors. Many of the 
subjects (60 percent) did not reveal any awareness even on an extended 
post-experimental interview and this group showed no evidence of con­
ditioning. In other words, post-experimental verbal repofts of the ^ ,,
subjects' awareness (i.e., ideas about the purpose of the experiment and 
what was expected of them) were highly correlated with behavior in this
16
situation. The distribution of responses was bimodal with the aware co- 
operators clustering around the most extreme conditioning score possible. 
The unaware subjects and aware resistors were distributed approximately 
normally around a conditioning score of zero. It was concluded that pre­
vious studies, because of poor interview techniques, had failed to detect 
all a,ware subjects. These few awares, responding at the extremes, were 
enough to raise the means in the predicted direction so as to produce an 
overall significant result. This effect had then been erroneously inter­
preted as evidence for conditioning without awareness.
The Staats and Staats experiment parallels the design of the 
Schafer and Murphy study quite closely. Both studies involved deception 
but did not include adequate procedures for checking on its effectiveness. 
Both studies involved a training series, where certain stimuli were con­
tiguously paired with other stimuli which supposedly elicited pleasant or 
unpleasant affect in the subject and a deceptively introduced test for 
change in behavior as a result of the training. In both studies, the 
significance of the data is accounted for by a sub-group of subjects 
who respond at the extremes while some subjects did not show the effect, 
at all. Results of both studies were interpreted as being similar to 
classical conditioning and thus nonvoluntary. Because of the similar­
ities of the operations used in the two experiments, it is at least 
possible that similar psychological processes underly the behavior 
observed in both situations.
Investigators of learning and awareness have attempted, at an 
empirical level, to show that verbal conditioning occurs only in aware 
subjects who cooperate. Their findings suggest that what the subject 
in an experiment thinks the experimenter wants him to do is more
17
influential than what he is specifically told to do. While the learning 
and awareness literature has been concerned mainly with the issue of learn­
ing with or without awareness, it has implications that cut across a wide
4
spectrum of current experimental methodology In psychology. At a more gen­
eral level, other psychologists have been concerned with similar considera­
tions to which we now turn.
Demand Characteristics
Within the context of a growing contemporary concern with the social 
psychology of the psychological experiment, fprne (1962) has advanced the 
concept of the "demand characteristics" of psychological experiments. Tra­
ditionally, psychologists have treated experimental subjects as if they 
were passive responders to stimuli. Orne finds this assumption difficult 
to justify. He asks: "How does the human subject perceive the laboratory
situation? How does he define his role? What does he think he is supposed 
to do?" A person who agrees to serve as a subject in a psychological ex­
periment implicitly agrees to perform a wide range of actions on request 
without inquiring as to their purpose or duration. The experimenter- 
subject relationship is very unique in that the experimenter has a high 
degree of control over the subject. The subject, possibly because of a 
high degree of respect for science or for more personal reasons such as 
"evaluation apprehension" (Rosenberg, 1965; Silverman, 1965), sees his 
role as that of being a good subject. In a sense, the subject's behavior 
in an experiment may be viewed as problem solving behavior. At some level 
he sees it as his task to discover what he is supposed to do (the exper­
imenter's hypothesis) and to validate his role as a good subject by doing 
it.
18
Orne calls the totality of Implicit or explicit cues which convey 
the experimental hypothesis to the subject, the demand characteristics of 
the experimental situation. These cues may be mediated by the experiment­
er's behavior or by the logic of the experimental procedure itself, such as 
a training-test sequence or a test-manipulation-retest sequence. Behavior 
in an experiment is viewed as determined by two sets of variables; (1) the 
experimental or independent variables and (2) demand characteristics as 
perceived by the subject in the experimental situation. Orne suggests that 
to the extent different experimenters or slightly different designs do not 
obtain the same results, they are mostly artifacts of demand characteris­
tics. Demand characteristics artifacts may explain why so many experimental 
results do not generalize to behavior outside the laboratory.
The demands of an experiment are aspects of the situation such as 
instructions, treatment conditions, or behavior of the experimenter which 
might communicate implicitly or explicitly that a specific response is 
expected by the experimenter rather than alternative responses. Demand 
characteristics are the demands of the experiment as perceived by the sub­
ject. Perceived demand characteristics may be either correct (i.e., corre­
lated with the experimenter's hypothesis) or incorrect. When they are 
correct, they are operationally equivalent to the concept of "awareness"
' i
as employed in the verbal conditioning literature.
It appears that the two formulations (awareness and demand 
characteristics) are actually describing the same psychological phenomena. 
The findings of awareness in verbal conditioning are merely specific ex­
perimental examples of the more general problem of demand characteristics 
in psychological experiments. It is not necessary to use two different 
languages t% describe these phenomena.
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Subsuming the concept of awareness under the broader concept of 
perceived demand characteristics allows the handling of all ideas or 
hypotheses that a subject might have with regard to the behavior expected 
of him in an experiment in one theoretical formulation. In this disserta­
tion, the terms awareness arid correct perceived demand characteristics 
are used interchangeably.
Subjects often have ideas about the behavior expected of them 
that are incorrect. It is also important to know about these. Incorrect 
perceived demand characteristics do not necessarily bias the data in the 
direction of the experimental hypothesis (i.e., increase the probability, 
of a type one error) as do those which are correct, but they do contribute 
to a larger variance in experiments (i.e., an increase in the probability 
of type two error).
The demand characteristics formulation makes a good deal of sense 
out of the learning and awareness literature. Some subjects correctly 
perceive the demand characteristics of the situation; they become aware 
of the relationship between the experimenter's reinforcements and their 
own behavior and then demonstrate that they are good subjects by increas­
ing their responses in the reinforced category.
In the language of the demand characteristics formulation, the 
significant results of a decade or more of«verbal conditioning research 
may be attributable to demand characteristics variables (or artifacts) 
rather than experimental variables. If demand characteristics variables 
do account for the verbal conditioning effect, then this has broad im­
plications for other areas of psychological experimentation. It raises 
an immediate question as to how many other studies, using different ap­
paratus and apparently demonstrating different phenomena, might have had
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designs with demand characteristics similar to those of verbal condition­
ing studies. If there are such studies, their data and conclusions are 
now suspect. It has already been indicated that the Schafer and Murphy 
(1943) experiment may be such a study.
CHAPTER II
PROBLEM
In Chapter 1, the possibility was explored that the classic 
Scha.fer-Murphy effect could be a result of subjects becoming aware or 
correctly perceiving the demand characteristics of the experimental 
situation and then cooperating by reporting more rewarded profiles.
The general hypothesis was advanced that the Schafer-Murphy effect 
could be better accounted for by assessing the perceived demand char­
acteristics than it can be by the original interpretation; that a 
genuine modification of perception has occurred as a result of the 
reward and punishment treatment. Previous studies have suggested that 
subjects may actually see both aspects of the reversible figures at the 
1/3 second exposure speed (Rock & Fleck, 1950; Smith & Hochberg, 1954).
If this'is true, then demand characteristics, as formulated in Chapter 1 
become a reasonable explanation for subjects decisions to report the re­
warded names.
In previous studies of the Schafer-Murphy effect, all subjects 
have been given identical reward and punishment treatment, yet there is 
a wide variation in the tendency to report rewarded profiles. We have 
already indicated that individual differences in susceptibility to mone­
tary reinforcement cannot account for this variance because of differences 
within subjects in the proportion of rewarded responses to the two ambiguous
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tést stimuli. Suppose that this variance were highly correlated with 
post-experimental reports, with subjects reporting that they thought 
the experimenter expected high rewarded response from them having high 
rewarded response, and subjects not having this idea having, as a group, 
a lower proportion of rewarded responses. If this were the case, then it 
would seem that the construct "perceived demand characteristics" better 
accounts for the data than does the construct "genuine perceptual re­
organization as a function of reward and punishment."
Pilot Studies
In line with the above formulation, a pilot Jfudy was conducted. 
The study was done to familiarize the experimenter with any problems 
that might arise in attempting to obtain data on a larger scale, to aid 
in the development of the extended post-experimental interview for use 
in the experiment, and to see if the Schafer-Murphy effect could be re­
plicated.* Of course, the experimenter was also interested in assessing 
the validity of the demand characteristics formulation before launching 
a time consuming and expensive large sample factorial experiment.
The first pilot studies were conducted during the last week of 
the semester. While it may seem unimportant to state the time during 
the semester that the experiment was run, this led to the fortuitous 
discovery of a very important variable on which the Schafer-Murphy effect 
seems to depend. This will be described later.
The original Schafer-Murphy (1943) procedure was followed. On 
the first five pilot subjects, the effect was not obtained. It was then 
decided to try the Jackson (1954) procedure which left out the number 
guessing originally employed during training by Schafer and Murphy. For
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the next six subjects, again no replication was obtained. The total number 
of previously rewarded test responses for the first 11 subjects was 58.
The total number of punished test responses was 58, There was a total of 
60 mistaken identifications. This is a relatively higher proportion of 
mistakes than was reported in previous studies.
At this point, it was discovered that a seemingly unimportant 
procedural detail employed in the earlier studies had been overlooked. 
Schafer and Murphy (1943) used improved "helping faces" outside of the 
tachistoscope for the subject to view between trials. Jackson (1954) 
does not say whether he used "helping faces," but he claimed to have 
replicated the earlier study carefully. He listed all of the points at 
which he changed the earlier procedure and he does not mention leaving 
out the "helping faces." Smith and Hochberg (1954) also used "helping 
faces."
It was decided to place helping faces on the wall of the exper­
imental room, and to again attempt to obtain the effect. Six more subjects 
were run under the more precise replication, with striking results. The 
proportion of mistaken identifications dropped from 35 percent to 22 per­
cent. This latter is comparable to the Jackson study (24 percent). The 
total number of previously rewarded responses was 55, while there were 
only 19 punished,responses. This compares to the Schafer-Murphy data 
where a 54-13 split was obtained on five subjects, and to Jackson's data 
where there was a 50-23 split for six subjects in one rewarc^ order and 
a 55-16 split for six subjects in the other order.
The six subjects in the above replication were given an extensive 
informal post-experimental interview. These interviews were tape recorded 
without the subjects' knowledge. Four of the subjects seemed quite aware
24
of the purpose of the experiment. All of the above reported Schafer- 
Murphy effect (55-19 split) was accounted for by these four subjects.
Both of the unaware subjects gave an equal number of rewarded and pun­
ished responses.
During the first week of the following semester, the main ex­
perimentation was begun. Fourteen subjects were run, but again there 
was no replication of the Schafer-Murphy effect. New and larger helping 
faces had been made which did not contain the extra eyes (see Figure 1, 
Chapter 1) outside of the actual profile. The helping faces were then 
changed back to those used in the first pilot study, but the effect was 
still not obtained on the next several subjects. At this time it was 
necessary to reformulate the problem in the light of these unexpected 
results.
Hypothesis One
Reflecting on the results of the pilot studies, it seemed that 
the differences observed between results obtained at the end of the 
previous semester and those obtained at the first of the next semester 
might be due to the differences in the subjects themselves. The former 
sample of subjects had completed an introductory course in psychology 
while the latter subjects had received no formal instruction in psychology. 
Schafer-Murphy and Jackson had used introductory psychology students, but 
they do not state whether the experiments were run early or late in the 
semester. Interestingly, the one study in the literature which did not 
replicate the original results (Rock & Fleck, 1950) used high school 
students, who more than likely had not completed a course in psychology, 
as subjects.
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In pilot studies, the psychologically sophisticated subjects 
used such language as "the effects of reinforcement on perception," and 
"1 confirmed the hypothesis," in describing the purpose of the experiment.
On the other hand, most of the psychologically naive subjects were not 
able to describe the purpose of the experiment correctly. Most of them 
knew that two profiles had always won money and that two profiles were 
present in the ambiguous test situation, but they did not make any con­
nection between the two contingencies. It seems that they simply did not 
have the necessary information available to perceive the experiment as an 
integrated whole. Two of these 14 subjects were aware (compared to four 
out of six among the sophisticated subjects). When they described their 
awareness, they used a different language, i.e., "The tester expected 1 
would see winners better than losers."
The above considerations lead to the first major hypothesis of
y
this dissertation; Psychologically sophisticated subjects will show the 
Schafer-Murphy effect to a significantly greater degree than will psycho­
logically naive subjects. This prediction was made because it was expected 
that sophisticated subjects would be more likely to become aware of the pur­
pose of the experiment. Also, awareness or correctly perceived demand 
characteristics was expected to lead to cooperation in the majority of 
subjects.
It could be that general sophistication factors such as age and 
number of years in college would also make for more awareness. Because 
of this possibility, it was considered necessary to build general sophis­
tication into the experimental design. It was predicted that general 
sophistication factors would not be as important for obtaining the Schafer- 
Murphy effect as the specific factor of sophistication in the field of psychology.
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Hypothesis Two
The second major hypothesis of this dissertation was formulated 
with regard to the general discussion of awareness and demand character­
istics presented in Chapter 1. Specifically, the hypothesis was that:
The tendency to report more rewarded profiles in the Schafer-Murphy 
situation will be highly correlated with post-experimental reports of 
awareness of the experimental hypothesis, and remoyal of the aware sub­
jects from the data will result in a relatiyely symmetrical distribution 
of rewarded response scores around a mean of 50 percent.
A secondary prediction was that it would not be awareness per se 
that accounted for the Schafer-Murphy effect. It was predicted that it 
would be possible to distinguish a sub-population of aware-cooperating 
subjects from the protocols of post-experimental interviews, and that 
awareness plus cooperation would actually account for the Schafer-Murphy 
effect.
In addition to the two major hypotheses, several other side issues 
were proposed for study by means of questions on an extended post-experimen­
tal interview. These issues were as follows; (1) Do subjects learn that 
two profiles consistently win and two consistently lose in the Schafer- 
Murphy situation? (2) Is reported motivation for the money used in the 
training series related to the Schafer-Murphy effect? (3) Do subjects 
■ know that two profiles are being presented in the test series? (4) How 
often do subjects, who know of the reversible nature of the test stimuli,- 
actually see both figures at 1/3 second exposure speed? (5) Do subjects 
report more winning profiles in the test situation because they expect 
that by such behavior they will continue to__win money as in the training 
series?
CHAPTER III
METHOD
Selection Of Subjects
A total of 130 undergraduate students enrolled in psychology 
courses at the University of Oklahoma were used as subjects in the ex­
periment. Ten of these were eliminated from the statistical analysis 
because they either misunderstood or ignored the instructions to report 
the name of one figure in the ambiguous test situation. Since the de­
pendent measure was based upon subjects reporting only one name when 
presented with the ambiguous test figures, there was no basis for com­
paring the behavior of these ten subjects who called both names with 
that of the others. The characteristics of th^ ten subjects eliminated 
from the analysis will be presented separately in the chapter on results.
Of the 120 subjects actually used in the analysis, 24 were se­
lected in a nonsystematic manner (from introductory psychology students) 
and assigned to a control group. The 96 subjects assigned to the ex­
perimental condition were drawn from four separate sub-populations within 
the larger population of undergraduate psychology students at the University 
of Oklahomàl /
Group 1 (N=24) or the underclass-naive sample, consisted of 14 
freshmen and ten sophomores enrolled in their first course in psychology. 
These students had received a minimum of one and a maximum of five weeks
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of instruction in psychology prior to their participation in the ex­
periment. This group included 15 females and nine males. The median 
age of the group was 19 with a range from 18 to 21.
Group II (N=24) or the upperclass-naive sample, consisted of 17 
juniors and seven seniors also enrolled in their first course in psychology. 
These students had received a minimum of one and a maximum of six weeks in­
struction in psychology prior to their participation in the experiment.
This group included eight females and 16 males. The median age of the
group was 20 with a range from 19 to 30.
Group III (N=24) or the underclass-sophisticated sample, con­
sisted of 13 freshmen and 11 sophomores enrolled in a second course in
psychology. All of these students had completed an introductory course
in psychology within one year prior to their participation in the ex­
periment and, in addition, had received a minimum of three and a maximum 
of six weeks instruction in a second psychology course. This group in­
cluded 13 females and 11 males. The median age of the group was 19 with 
a range from 18 to 22. This group was more sophisticated than their 
underclass counterparts in introductory psychology in another, and perhaps 
very important sense; 71 percent of them had previously participated in at 
least one psychological experiment.
Group IV (N=24) or the upperclass-sophisticated sample, consisted 
of 13 juniors and 11 seniors. They were all upperclassmen with previous 
coursework in psychology, but they varied considerably with regard to the 
amount of previous coursework. The median number of previous semester 
hours in psychology was nine with a range from three to 18 hours. This 
group included seven females and 17 males. The median age of the group 
was 21 with a range from 19 to 31. This group was also sophisticated in .
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another sense in that 50 percent of them had participated in at least 
one psychological experiment.
Subjects from all groups except Group III knew in advance that 
they would receive two points added to their final course grade for 
participating in experiments. They could select the experiments they 
participated in or choose not to participate, however, they cannot be 
considered as volunteers. Group III did not expect to receive grade 
points for participation. An attempt was made to approximately equate 
Group III with the others with regard to extrinsic motivation to parti­
cipate by offering them 90 cents in money for volunteering for the 
experiment. An attempt was made to check on the equality of the values 
of two points or 90 cents as motivation for participating in the experi­
ment. All subjects in Group III and an equal number selected from the 
other groups were asked, after the experiment, which was more valuable 
to them. Of the subjects asked, 89 percent said that the 2 points had 
more value. Thus, if extrinsic motivation to participate in the ex­
periment is important. Group III was not comparable to the other three 
groups.
In summary, it was not possible to match the four experimental 
sub-populations on all possible variables. However, the groups could 
be unambiguously classified in a 2 X 2 factorial design in terms of the 
variable of college classification (which,incidentally,could be labeled 
as "age" with very few exceptions) and that of psychological sophistication. 
The latter variable is the more important and for this main effect in the 
design, the matching is quite comparable. Table 1 presents a summary de­
scription of the subject samples. It also illustrates the factorial 
design used in the present experiment.
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Table 1
Summary of Characteristics of the Subject Populations
Psychologically
Group
Psychologically
Naive Sophisticated Totals
Group I V Group III Underclassmen
Freshmen = 14 ' Freshmen = 13 Freshmen = 27
Sophomores = 10 Sophomores = 11 Sophomores = 21
Females = 15 Females = 13 Females = 28
Under­ Males = 9 Males = 11 Males = 20
classmen M d . Age = 19 Md. Age = 19 Md. Age = 19
Age Range = 18-21 Age Range = 18-22 Age Range = 18-22
Md.Hrs.Psy. 0 M d . Hrs.Psy. = 3
TOTAL N 24 TOTAL N 24 TOTAL N = 4 8
Group II Group IV Upperclassmen
Juniors = 17 Juniors = 13 Juniors = 30
Seniors = 7 Seniors =, 11 Seniors = 18
Females = 8 Females = 7 Females = 15
Upper­ Males = 16 Males = 17 Males = 33
classmen M d . Age = 20 M d . Age = 21 Md. Age = 21
Age Range = 19-30 Age Range = 19-31 Age Range = 19-31
Md.Hrs.Psy,, = 0 Md. Hrs.Psy. = 9
TOTAL N = 24 TOTAL N = 24 TOTAL N = 4 8
Naive Sophisticated Experimental
Underclass = 24 Underclass = 24 Underclass = 48
Upperclass = 24 Upperclass = 24 Upperclass = 48
Females = 23 Females = 20 Females = 43
Totals Males = 25 Males = 28 Males = 53
M d . Age = 20 M d . Age = 20 Md. Age = 20
Age Range = 18-30 Age Range = 18-31 Age Range = 18-31
Md .Hrs.Psy 0 Md.Hrs.Psy. = 3
TOTAL N = 48 TOTAL N = 48 TOTAL N = 9 6
Control Group
All Naive 
Underclassmen = 17
Upperclassmen = 7
N^Fèmales = 1 1
Males = 13
Md. Age = 20
Age Range = 18-26
TOTAL N = 2 4
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Apparatus And Materials 
A standard Dodge tachistoscope was used for presentation of the 
stimuli. This instrument has a constantly lighted white background field 
located 36 inches from the viewing port. Stimuli were presented by means 
of mirrors at a viewing distance of 18 inches. The illumination of the 
stimulus field and the background field were equated for brightness. The 
instrument was calibrated for an exposure speed of 1/3 second by means of 
a photo cell connected to an electronic timer.
The tachistoscope was placed on top of a large desk in an experi­
mental room approximately 10 X 10 feet in size. This arrangement placed 
the viewing port of the tachistoscope at approximately eye level when the 
subject was seated at the desk. Large cardboard shields (2 1/2 X 3 feet) 
were attached to either side of the tachistoscope to eliminate the possi­
bility of the subject seeing the stimuli as they were being inserted or 
removed from the tachistoscope. The subject could, however, see the head 
and shoulders of the standing experimenter.
To eliminate any glare from the overhead lights in the room, a 
cardboard shield was constructed to extend out over the viewing port from 
the top of the tachistoscope. As an added precaution, the overhead light 
directly above the subject was left off during the experiment. Thus, while 
the subject experienced little or no glare from outside light sources, the 
overall illumination of the experimental room remained approximately that 
of an average illuminated room.
Eight stimulus figures, each having an outside diameter of three 
inches, were drawn in black ink on white cardboard cards 7 1 / 2 X 9  inches 
in size. These figures were reproduced as accurately as possible from 
those reported by Jackson (1954). On four of the stimulus cards were
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drawn the half circle training figures illustrated in Figure 3. The names 
were not written under the figures for the actual stimuli. Two of the 
stimulus cards contained the ambiguous test figures illustrated in Figure 4. 
The remaining two cards contained the nonambiguous set breaking figures 
illustrated in Figure 5. In addition, four improved replicas or "help 
faces" similar to the training stimuli shown in Figure 2 were mounted on 
the wall of the experimental room at a viewing distance of approximately 
eight feet from the subject. Also, approximately eighty dollars in dimes 
was used over the course of the entire experiment as rewards and punish­
ments for the subjects.
Experimental Procedure
It was difficult to determine from the Schafer-Murphy (1943) study 
the exact procedure at many points. A clearer statement of procedure, 
though different from the original at some points, was given by Jackson 
(1954). Since he achieved a successful replication, the changes in his 
procedure were considered as noncritical to the production of the Schafer- 
Murphy effect. The majority of later studies follow procedures similar to 
his. For these reasons, Jackson's procedure was followed as closely as 
possible for all four experimental groups in the'present study, except 
that 10 cents instead of 15 cents was used as the reward. The use of a 
control group which learned the stimuli without the reward and punishment 
procedure necessitated a modification of instructions for that group which 
Will be presented later.
Experimental Groups. The subjects were ushered into the experimen­
tal room and told to be seated comfortably in front of the tachistoscope. 
Prior to their entry, two groups of dimes had been placed on the desk to
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Figure 3. The four individual profile figures used in the training series,
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Figure 4. The two composite ambiguous profile figures used in the test
series.
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Figure 5. The two nonreverslble set breaking profile figures used in the
test series.
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the subject's right. The group of dimes nearest the subject contained 
five dimes, the other group of diiriès' contained approximately 15 dimes.
The initial instructions for the experimental groups were as follows :
This is an experiment in vision. I am going to expose 
each of four profiles or faces rapidly a number of times in 
this machine. When either of two of the profiles is shown, 
you will actually win ten cents. When either of the other 
two is shown you will lose ten cents. I will start you off 
with fifty cents which you may consider as your pay for par­
ticipating in the experiment. Your winnings and losings will
be added to or subtracted from this amount. You may keep
whatever you end up with. Also, each profile has a name and 
your task will be to learn the name that goes with each profile.
To summarize what we shall do: (a) I shall announce the name
of each face about to be presented. (b) You will observe the
face in the machine. (c) You will repeat the name of the face 
aloud so that I will know that you have seen it and also this
will.help you to learn it. (d) I shall tell you whether you
have won or lost ten cents, (e) You will take or return 
(demonstrating) ten cents and then we will go on to the next
trial. Do you have any questions?
The training series was then begun) It consisted of 25 presen­
tations of each of the four half-circle profile outlines (refer to Figure 
2) totaling 100 training trials. After the first 50 trials and again at 
the end of 100 trials, a three minute rest period was given.' This was 
shortened from the five minutes used in the original studies to three % 
minutes when it was observed in the pilot studies that subjects seemed to 
become restless with the longer rest periods and typically attempted to 
engage the experimenter in conversation regarding the purpose of the ex­
periment.
The rest periods seemed to serve two functions in the experiment. 
First, they gave both the experimenter and the subject a necessary rest 
from the tedious and prolonged test series. Second, they gave the subject
an opportunity to study the "help faces" on the wall which, as suggested
by the pilot work, both facilitated learning and gave the subject the time
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needed to scan the profiles and thereby discover the possibility of the 
pieces fitting like a jigsaw puzzle. Both of these functions seemed to be 
adequately served by a three minute rest period.
During the traning for a given subject, the winning of a dime 
(reward) was consistently paired with two of the profiles and the losing 
of a dime (punishment) was consistently paired with the other two profiles.
The profiles receiving reward and those receiving punishment were system­
atically counterbalanced between subjects so that half of the subjects 
received rewards paired with Nathan and Duncan (N-D order) and the other 
half received rewards paired with Bertrand and Clifford (B-C order). This 
was done in an attempt to control for direction of facing and position of 
the eye dots for the different profiles (see Figure 3).
The sequence of presentations of the profiles was the same for all 
subjects during training. This sequence was determined by use of a table 
of random numbers, with two restrictions. First, the same profile could 
not appear twice in succession and second, there had to be an equal number^ 
of presentations of each of the four profiles within the series of 100 trials.
Because reward was consistently paired with two of the profiles and 
punishment with the other two, all subjects ended the training series with 
their original 50 cents. However, there was wide fluctuation in the amount 
of money that the subject had in his group of dimes over the course of 
training. The fluctuations ranged from 20 cents to one dollar.
During the first eight training trials, subjects attention was 
directed to the help faces on the wall before they viewed them in the 
tachistoscope. After the first eight trials, no further mention was made 
of the help faces. It was observed, however, that many subjects made 
frequent reference to these help faces between training trials, during
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the rest periods, and before reporting their perception in the test 
series.
The tachistoscopic exposure speed for all phases of the experiment 
was 1/3 of a second. The experimenter made frequent checks between indivi­
dual subjects to insure that all of the bulbs in the tachistoscope were 
working properly and that proper exposure speed was maintained.
Control Group. For the control group, 100 trials of training 
were also given, but the dimes were not present and no reference was made 
to the winning and losing of money. The initial instructions were as 
follows: -
This is an experiment in vision. I am going to expose 
each of four profiles, or faces, rapidly a number of times 
in this machine. Each profile has a name and your task will 
be to learn the name that goes with each profile. To summarize 
what we shall do; (a) I shall announce the name of the face 
about to be presented, (b) You will observe the face in the 
machine. (c) You will repeat the name of the face aloud so 
that I will know that you have seen it and also this will help 
you to learn it; (d) Then we will go on to the next trial.
Do you have any questions?
Test Trials. At the end of the second three minute rest period, 
identical instructions for beginning the test were given to subjects in
Û-
all groups. For the experimental subjects, the money was left on the 
table and no further reference was made to the winning and losing of 
money. The following instructions were given:
Now we shall see how well you learned the faces and 
whether you can distinguish new faces from old, I am going 
to present the faces as I did before, except that this time 
they will be in a complete circle. All you have to do is to 
tell me the name of the face that you see. Quite frequently 
a new and strange face will be presented. When you do not 
recognize the face as one of those shown previously, you can 
indicate that the face'is strange by saying "X." 0. k.?
Originally it was planned to add the phrase; "Do you have any 
questions?" which was reportedly done by Jackson. However, in the pilot
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work with naive subjects, this was found to be impossible. The typical 
question asked by these naive subjects was; "But there will be two faces 
if you put them in a circle. Am I supposed to name them both?" This put 
the experimenter in the position of having to deny that both would be pre­
sent or of saying "No, just name one," or remaining silent. Therefore, it 
was decided to merely say "0. k." in a tone of voice that implied that no 
questions would be answered. This reduced the amount of questions asked 
but did not entirely eliminate the problem. Apparently, the instructions 
appeared ambiguous and misleading to several of the naive subjects and 
their impulse, quite justifiably, was to ask for clarification which often 
destroyed the intent of the deceptive instructions. When such incidents 
arose in the main experiment, the experimenter attempted to handle them 
by remaining silent when possible. If the subject insisted on a verbal 
answer, the experimenter attempted to be as noncommittal as possible.
It is very interesting to note that this problem did not arise with the 
sophisticated subjects. They, typically, did not ask questions and had 
little apparent trouble in understanding and carrying out the instructions.
After the above instructions were given, a series of 30 test trials 
using the ambiguous or reversible test stimuli (refer to^Figure 4) were be­
gun. Between each test trial a nonreversible set breaking figure (refer 
to Figure 5) facing in the opposite direction from the profile the sub­
ject last reported seeing, was presented. Thus, there was a total of 
60 presentations of stimuli in the test series.
During the test series, the experimenter remained seated behind 
the screen so that he could more easily record the subject's responses.
In the training series, he had remained standing while operating the
I,
tachistoscope. Before e % h  trial, the experimenter said, "ready" which
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was the subject's signal to prepare to view the stimulus. After viewing 
the figure, the subject reported verbally the name of the figure he saw. 
These were recorded on a prepared data sheet by the experimenter. The 
order of presentation of the test trials was the same for all subjects.
The order of presentation was determined from a table of random numbers 
with the restrictions that each of the two test stimuli occurred five times 
in each block of ten test trials and a single test figure could not appear 
more than twice in succession.
Extended Interviews. After the test series, all 96 experimental 
subjects were given an extended post-experimental interview question­
naire. The 24 control subjects were given an abbreviated form of the 
same questionnaire. Based on the reticence of pilot subjects to engage 
in an oral interview, it was decided to give the interview in written 
form. This form also allowed for control over variations in the question­
ing procedure. The questions were presented individually on half sheets 
of paper stapled together in booklet form. Subjects went through the 
booklet answering one question at a time. They were not allowed to look 
ahead to the next question until they had completed the earlier one and 
they were not allowed to go back and add anything to previous answers 
once they had turned the page.
The questionnaire was carefully constructed so that clues as to 
the nature of the experiment were not given until the later part of the 
questionnaire. It was intended that a subject's correct verbalization 
of the purpose of the experiment (his awareness) expressed at the first 
of the interview would be weighted heavier in scoring the interview than 
would the same verbalization expressed at the end of the questionnaire. ' 
Instructions for the extended interview questionnaire were as follows:
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We now come to the most important part of the experiment.
We want to find out what you thought the experiment was about 
while it was going on. I have here a booklet containing 
several questions concerning what you thought about during 
the experiment. Please answer each question in order, before 
going on to the next question. Once you have turned a page, 
do not go back and change your answers to previous questions.
Please answer each question as conscientiously and truthfully 
as possible, because, as I said, this is the most important 
part of the experiment.. Keep in mind that we want to know 
about things you thought of during the experiment" and not 
things that might occur to you in retrospect as you are 
writing. Feel free to explain your answers in detail.
Later you will have a chance to ask questions and to find 
out what this is all about.
The questionnaires for both the experimental'and the.control 
groups may be found in Appendix A.
"The door to the experimental room was opened so that the subject 
could not refer to the helping faces on the wall. After the subject had 
completed the questionnaire, he was given his fifty cents in winnings 
(or in the case of Group III, ninety cents) and allowed to ask any 
questions that he might have regarding the experiment. The experimenter 
revealed all deceptions and discussed the overall purpose of the research 
candidly. The importance of not discussing the experiment with anyone 
for the duration of the semester was stressed. Each subject then signed 
a written statement to the effect that he would not discuss the experiment 
with anyone. ^
The length of time required for the entire experimental session 
. varied from 55 t:p 65 minutes depending on how much time the subject 
spent in filling out the questionnaire.
CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
X' Scoring Procedures
As a first step in the analysis of the data, it was necessary to 
decide on an adequate method of scoring the test responses. Schafer and 
Murphy (1943), Jackson (1954), and others who have worked with this phe­
nomena considered each individual test response for each subject as an 
independent event. They then summed (across subjects) the total number 
of correct test responses which had been previously rewarded and also 
the total number of correct responses which had been previously punished. 
Incorrect responses (the calling of Clifford, Duncan, or "X" when the 
Nathan-Bertrand test stimuli was presented, etc.) were left out of the 
analysis. Schafer and Murphy then applied a one sample proportion test 
to these data while Jackson used a chi square goodness of fit test.
Both of these statistical procedures are illegitimate because the fre­
quencies are not based upon independent observations. Each subject 
contributed a number of responses to the total of both the rewarded and 
punished categories. The proportions of rewarded versus punished responses 
between subjects were grossly unequal and within subjects, they were . 
dependent; i.e., as reward goes up, punished must go down.
Thus, the problem in scoring the data in the present experiment 
was to obtain an index of tendency to report rewarded profiles which
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would be comparable to the measures used previously and yet would be more 
adequate for statistical analysis. It was deemed desirable to have one 
score for each subject, representing the ^ tendency to report rewarded pro­
files, only for those trials on which he gave a correct response. As in 
previous studies, the number of mistakes for any given subject was con­
sidered primarily a function of individual visual acuity.
The required score was arrived at for each subject by dividing 
the total number of times that the names of the two rewarded profiles 
were correctly reported during the test series by the total number of 
correct responses. That score, in turn, was multiplied by 100 to obtain 
a percentage of rewarded responses score. These scores were then used in 
the analysis. All subjects performed at a level better than 50 percent 
correct responses. The range of mistakes was from zero to 15 of the 30 
trials and the median number of mistakes was three.
Another problem in scoring concerned the number of test trials 
over which the behavior was to be scored. Schafer and Murphy based their 
analysis only on the first 16 test trials because they found the effect 
only up to that point. Jackson did not find a change in results when 
all of the test trials were scored. A preliminary look at the present 
data, which is based on five times the number of subjects used in both 
previous studies combined, did not reveal any substantial differences 
between using the first 16 trials as an index or using all of the test 
trials. It can be argued that a percentage score based on a possible 30 
responses is a more stable index than one based on only 16, and therefore 
the analysis presented in this chapter is based on the former index. An 
explanation for Schafer and Murphy's loss of statistical significance 
after the first 16 trials can probably be found in examining their use of
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a small sample of subjects in terms of awareness. This problem will be 
taken up in the discussion c h a g ^ r .
In order to compare the control group to the other groups, it was 
necessary to arbitrarily assign half of the control subjects to one reward 
order (N-D) and the other half to the other order (B-C). The control sub­
jects were then scored in the same manner as the experimental subjects.
Next, the post-experimental interviews for awareness were carefully
read and scored for awareness-unawareness by four independent judges. One
;
of these judges was the experimenter and the other three were advanced grad­
uate students in psychology at the University of Oklahoma. These latter 
three judges had no knowledge of the subjects behavior on the test. Judges 
were instructed in detail as to the procedures of the experimental session. 
They were told to weigh the first part of the interview more heavily in 
their judgments than the later part. Judgments were made, forced choice, 
for aware-unaware. Further instructions were given to the effect that 
only subjects who were clearly aware of the experimenter's hypothesis were 
to be classified as aware. Subjects who's awareness was doubtful were 
scored as unaware. As a further precaution against attributing awareness 
to a subject where such an attribution might be questionable, only those 
39 subjects on which there was 100 percent agreement among the four judges 
were considered as aware for purposes of data analysis.
The judges also rated each subject on a five-point scale for 
cooperation-noncooperation. This data was for use in the correlational 
and nonparametric analyses.
Hypothesis One
Recall the first hypothesis advanced in Chapter 2 that psycholo­
gically sophisticated subjects would show the Schafer-Murphy effect to a
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greater degree. Relevant data are presented in Table 2 which displays 
the mean percent of rewarded responses for the four experimental groups 
and the control group. Table 3 presents the corresponding analysis of 
variance. It can be seen that the naive subject population (X = 52.13) 
differs significantly (F = 4.59, P <.05) from the sophisticated popu­
lation (X = 60.25), supporting the first hypothesis.
In addition to the factors shown in Table 2, the data were also 
partitioned in terms of reward order (N-D versus B-C order). The con­
trasts below the line in Table 3 are not orthogonal to the sources of 
variance above the line. These later contrasts were pulled out on a- 
priori grounds in order to pinpoint some of the sources of variation in 
the experiment.
Table 3 also shows that there is no significant difference be­
tween underclassmen (X = 55.31) and upperclassmen (X = 57.65). This 
variable was inserted into the design as a control variable. From this 
nonsignificant result we can infer that it is more than likely not gen­
eral sophistication factors such as number of years in college and age 
that make for the increased Schafer Murphy effect. This in turn, lends 
credence to the possibility that the effect is mediated by a more spe­
cific factor such as knowledge of the field of psychology. Because of
the lack of significance, the college classification factor will not be 
included in further analysis of the data.
The contrast between the control group and all experimental groups
was not significant. This is not surprising since the mean of the two 
naive groups (X = 52.13) is quite close to that of the control group (X = 
50.75). When the naive (X = 52.13) and the sophisticated (X = 60.25) 
groups are contrasted separately with the control, the difference is
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Table 2
DÎ Senaxded Responses for Five Groups in the Experiment
5syr3iDlogi cally 
Halve
Psychologically
Sophisticated Totals
60.08 55.31
60.42 57.6553.71
56.1960.2552.13
Control Group
50.75
Table 3
Analysis of "Variance for the Data in Table 2 
cRiwfT r-^ xS lEaTÏamæ MS df F
1584.37
73.49 
48.16
567.68
53.50
345.25
4.59
1.64
^  .05
NS
NS
NS
NS
110
— $-C Order
I I IT ■ 1 J.1I
9511.80
1444.00
30.25
1
1
1
27.55
4.18
z: .001 
<  .05
NS
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significant (F = 4.18, P^.05) for the sophisticated group but not for the 
naive. Thus, a replication of the Schafer-Murphy effect was obtained only 
with psychologically sophisticated subjects.
The difference between reward orders comes out as the most sig­
nificant source of variation (F = 27.55, P^.OOl) in the experiment. This 
result was entirely unanticipated. This effect does not appear in the con­
trol group where the scoring of reward order was arbitrary. This suggests 
that something other than figure dominance is occurring in the experimental 
groups.
Table 4 presents the means of the five groups of the experiment 
when the data is broken by reward order. It may be seen that three of 
the four experimental groups have N-D order means that are lower than 
the control mean for N-D order. All of the B-C means are above the A-D 
and the control means. This puzzling order effect will be further ana­
lyzed later in this chapter.
Hypothesis Two
A second major hypothesis proposed in Chapter 2 was that there 
would be a highly significant positive correlation between subjects' 
verbalization of awareness of the experimental hypothesis and tendency 
to report rewarded profiles during the test. '
The judges agreed 100 percent as to aware-unaware for 77 of the 
96 experimental subjects. The 19 subjects on which agreement was less 
than 100 percent were about evenly split with regard to those scored 
aware by three judges and unaware by the fourth and those scored unaware 
by three judges and aware by the fourth. However, they were composed of 
more sophisticated subjects (N =14) than naive subjects (N=5). Of the 77 ’
[A
4:8
Table 4
Mean Percentage of Rewarded Responses 
for the Five Groups in the Experiment, 
Breaking by Reward Order
Psychologically Psychologically
Naive Sophisticated Totals
Under­
classmen N-D* . .41.46 N-D 47.30 55.31
B-C 65.67 B-C 69.21
Upper­
classmen - N-D 42.33 N-D 56.08 "57.65
B-C 65.83 B-C 65.55
Totals 52.13 60.08 56.19
Control Group
N-D
B-C
49.10
52.25
Total 50.75
*Reward Order
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subjects unanimously classified as either aware or unaware, 39 were aware 
and 38 were unaware. The point biserial correlation between awareness and 
behavior on the test was r^^ = .52 which was highly significant (t = 5.29, 
P ^ .001, df = 75).
Another way of illustrating the same relationship is to classify 
the data in a 2 X 2 contingency table according to the variables of aware 
versus unaware and percent rewarded score of 50 or below versus those above 
50 percent. Such a classification is presented in Table 5. Of the 39 a- 
ware subjects, only eight (21 percent) scored below 50 percent, while 23 
(61 percent) of the unaware subjects scored below 50 percent. The chi 
square diÉt of this association was highly significant (X^ = 12.81, df =
1, P<.001).
Thus, the second major hypothesis, that awareness is related to 
tendency to give high percentages of rewarded responses in the Schafer- 
Murphy situation, is strongly supported by the data.
Recall from Chapter 2 the proposal that it is not the awareness
per se which mediates the higher percentage of responses in the direction 
of the experimenter's hypothesis among aware subjects. Rather, when a- 
wareness is present, the subject has the alternative of either cooperating 
or not cooperating. It was proposed that the decision to cooperate with
the experimenter is the important factor in producing the behavior. If
this proposal were correct, then the strength of the awareness effect 
should be improved by singling out only aware cooperating subjects and 
comparing them to all others.
The judges classified 29 of the 39 aware subjects as at least 
partial cooperators. The other ten awares were classified as either not 
cooperating or deliberately resisting. When the 29 cooperating subjects
50 ■
Table 5
Frequencies of Rewarded Response Scores Above and Below ■ 
50 Percent for Aware and Unaware Subjects
Aware Uhaware Totals
-
Above 31 15 46
^ Below 8 23
i
31
Totals 39 38 77
(X = 12.81, df = 1, P <.001)
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versus all others were correlaaæd mliüi Sïeâiavior, the correlation Increased 
to r^^ = .70 which is h i ^ l y  sigpificaiit (t = 8.49, df = 75, P^.OOOl).
This represents a substantial imctease tn prediction over the correlation 
based only on awareness alcnse =  -523-
Figure 6 presents the fiinr^ itnncy distribution of all 48 unaware 
and noncooperating subjects segaraltely i m m  that of the 29 cooperating 
aware subjects. The medians (s£ these two distributions are quite differ­
ent (48 versus 81). It may he seem that removing the aware cooperators 
from the data completely elinmmates lupward skew in the overall distri­
bution, The distribution o£ awate omopezators is very similar to the 
overall distributions reported im the Srdiafer-Murphy (1943) and the Jackson 
(1954) studies.
The increase in predicttaBDilitty that occurs when cooperation- 
noncooperation is taken into adommmt mag^ be further illustrated by 
classifying only the 39 aware smiBDjectts <0n tbis variable and comparing 
them on behavior (see Table 6)- The chi square test for this association 
is highly significant (X^ = 12-86, d£ =  1, 2^.001). »
The two cooperating smbjedts wdm were below 50 percent rewarded 
responses were special eases - Eau&i of them reported that they did not 
become aware until about the imitMle of the test series, at which time they 
began cooperating. Inspectioim of theiTr réponses shows that they responded 
predominantly with punished profile names for more than the first half of 
the test trials. They then sanddemly reversed themselves and reported no­
thing but rewarded profile nones for the, remainder of the test. One of 
these subjects exclaimed, "’flfci"' aflter the 17tb trial. He never missed 
reporting a rewarded after <rthait- trial. - _
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Figure 6. Frequency distributions for (a) the 48 unaware and noncooperat­
ing subjects and (b) the 29 aware cooperating subjects.
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Table 6
Frequencies of Aware Cooperators and Noncooperators 
Who Score Above and Below 50 Percent 
Rewarded Responses
Cooperate Noncooperate Totals
Above 27 4 31
Below 2 6 8
Totals 29 10 • 39
(X^ =12.86, df = 1, P^.OOl) '
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Internal Analyses 
The Order Effect. The significance of the order effect found in 
the main analysis, i.e., subjects in the B-C order scored higher, neces­
sitated further analysis of the data. Because it was suspected that 
awareness had something to do with this effect, only those 77 subjects 
on which inter-judge agreement was obtained on awareness were used in 
this analysis. The control group which did not show a significant order 
effect and could not be classified with regard to aware-unaware was also 
not included in this analysis.
In order to evaluate the possibility that an unequal proportion 
of recognitions for a single figure was producing the order effect, the 
data was rescored in terms of percentage of correct responses of each re­
warded figure separately.
Table 7 shows the mean rewarded and punished responses obtained 
under reward, control, and punished conditions for each of the faces. The 
control means are included for comparison purposes although they were not 
included in the analysis. In this table, the same subjectsycontribute a 
score to each of four of the cells. For example, the scores in the cells 
Nathan-Duncan rewarded and Bertrand-Clifford punished are contributed by 
the same subjects. Also, the responses were made to only two ambiguous 
test situations (Nathan-Bertrand and Clifford-Dunca.n). Therefore, the 
diagonals for these two blocks necessarily add to 100 percent. As a re­
sult, only the scores in the rewarded part of this table were included in 
the analysis of variance shown in Table 8. Inspection of the table re­
veals that it is only the means of the scores of the 38 subjects in the 
Bertrand-Clifford reward order that do not compare closely to the re­
spective control group means. Yet, their scores compare closely among
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Table 7
Mean Percentage of Rewarded and Punished Test Responses 
Scored Separately for Each of the Four Figures
Figures
Nathan Bertrand Clifford Duncan Totals
Rewarded 50.41 64.89 66.63 44.69 56.54
N=39 N=38 N=38 N=39 N=154
Control 47.87 52.13 53.38 46.62 50.00
N=24 N=24 N=24 N=24 N=96
Punished 35.11 49.59 55.31 33.37 43.46
N=38 N=39 N=39 N=38 N=154
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Table 8
Summary of the Analysis of Variance for Awareness, Subject Population, 
Reward Order, and Figures Within Order for the 77 Subjects 
Who Could be Unambiguously Classified on Awareness*
Adjusted
Source of Variance Mean Square df , F P
Awareness 5169.6 1 5.36 ^  .05
Sophistication of 
Population 788.8 1 .82 NS
Reward Order 6404.3 1 6.64 <  .05
Awareness x Population 1186.4 1.23 NS
Awareness x Order 257.7 1 - NS
Population x Order 37.8 1 - NS
3-way Interaction 91.6 1 NS
Figures Within Order 143.8 2 NS
Figures x Population 2261.9 2 1.75 NS
Figures x Awareness 1219.0 2 - NS
3-way Interaction 1280.6 2 NS
Error 964.5 69
Nested Error 1226.6 69 -
*Method of unweighted means (Winer, 1962)
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themselves. This is an important point that will be taken up later in 
the nonparametric analysis.
In Table 8 it may be seen that sophistication of population which 
was the significant variable in the first analysis (Table 3, page 48) does 
not approach significance in this analysis. This is as it should be if 
support for the awareness hypothesis is to be obtained. Recall that the 
reason for predicting a significant sophistication of population effect 
was that there would be more awareness in the sophisticated group. If 
this were the case, then when awareness and sophistication were pulled 
out as independent factors, the awareness factor should be significant 
(and it is, F = 5.36, P<.05) while the subject population factor should 
not be significant (F = .82, NS). The interaction between awareness and 
subject population (F = 1.23, NS) also is not significant. Therefore, 
support is also found for the awareness hypothesis in this analysis. This 
analysis makes clear the source of the significant difference found be­
tween subject populations in the experiment, i.e., the sophisticated group 
scores higher because more of them are aware.
Again, this analysis indicates a significant reward order effect 
(F = 6.64, P^.05). The significance of this effect is somewhat less 
pronounced in the second analysis. Apparently some of this effect was 
absorbed in the higher-order interactions (none of which reached sig­
nificance). The figures within order effect does not approach significance. 
Thus, the possibility that the order effect is the result of a single fig­
ure being dominant is ruled out. The second analysis yields some new 
information, but the order effect remains unexplained.
' A further exploration of the order effect was carriM out by the
■ \ ' \  
use Of nonparametric techniques. When the 77 individuals utilized in the
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above analysis are classified according to the variables reward order and 
scores above and below 50 percent rewarded responses (see Table 9), a high­
ly significant association (X^ = 22.91, df = 1, .001) is found. This is
essentially the same relation as the order effect in the analysis of variance.
Further examination of the data at least partially accounts for the 
magnitude of the above result. Recall from Table 5 (page 50) that awares 
score high while unawares score low. Table 10 shows that there is a great­
er proportion of awares in the B-C group (61 percent) than in the A-D
group (41 percent). This relation approaches statistical significance 
2
(X = 2.93, df = 1, P<.10), and could account for some of the order 
effect.
- Cooperation among aware subjects has already been found to be
more predictive of high rewarded responses than awareness alone (see
Figure 5, page 35). If the B-C order which includes more aware subjects
also included a higher proportion of cooperators, then this would further
account for the order effect. Table 11 in fact, shows that there is a 
2
significantly (X = 4.67, df = 1, P^.05) greater proportion (87 percent) 
of cooperators in the B-C order than in the N-D order (56 percent).
The data in Table 7 now makes sense. The scores for the Bertrand 
and Clifford means were contributed by the same subjects. More of these 
subjects were aware and more of them cooperated. Therefore, the means 
are high. The scores for the Nathan and Duncan means were contributed 
by another group of subjects. In this group there were fewer awares, 
and of these awares, seven did not cooperate. Of these seven noncooper­
ators in the N-D group, six scored below 50 percent rewarded responses.
The scores of four of these were individually significant (binomial test. 
Walker & Lev, 1953) in the opposite direction from the hypothesis (30
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Table 9
Frequencies of Subjects Scoring Above and Below 50 Percent 
Rewarded Responses in the Two Reward Orders
Reward Order
N-D B-C Totals
Above 50 percent 13 33 46
50 percent or below 26 5 31
Totals 39 38 77
(X^ = 22.91, df = 1, P<.001)
Table 10
Frequencies of Aware and Unaware Subjects in the Two Reward Orders
Reward Order
N-D B-C Totals
Aware 16 23 39
Unaware
\
23 15 ' #8
Totals 39 38 77
(X = 2.93, df = 1, P^.IO)
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Table 11 
a #
Frequencies of Cooperating and Noncooperating Aware Subjects
in the Two Reward Orders
Reward Order
N-D B-C Totals
Cooperate 9 20 29
Noncooperate 7 3 10
Totals 16 23 39
(X = 4.67, df = 1, P<.05)
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percent or beloy). The net result of the factor of awareness in the N-D 
group was that the cooperators and the resistors balanced each other, and 
the mean percent rewarded scores remained similar to those of the control 
group.
In summary, it seems that the order effect is associated with un­
equal distributions of awares and unawares and cooperators and noncooperators 
in the two reward orders. Whether or not the B-C order actually facilitated 
awareness is impossible to determine from the data. It seems more likely 
that it was the unequal proportions of awares in the two groups which pro­
duced the order effect rather than the order effect producing the awareness 
because the order effect is not significant in the control group.
Other Data. Some other factors relevant to the Schafer-Murphy 
effect were also examined in the extended interview of the present ex­
periment. The original interpretation of the effect was that the pleasant 
experience associated with winning money was mediating the behavior. Ac­
cording to this interpretation, subjects who score high should be the same 
subjects who were motivated by the money. Question seven of the extended 
interview (Appendix A) was intended to distinguish between subjects who 
were motivated by the money and those who were not. A point biserial 
correlation was computed between this measure and percentage of rewarded 
responses on the test. The correlation coefficient for this test was
«
r^y = .136 which is not significantly different from zero. If we assume 
that asking subjects a yes-no question concerning their interest in win­
ning the money is even a rough index of degree of motivation for the 
money, then there appears to be no relationship between desire for money 
and the Schafer-Murphy effect. In contrast to this correlation, recall 
that percentage of rewarded responses was highly correlated (r^^ = .70,
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P < . 0 0 p  with awareness plus cooperation. The latter is an index of 
motivation to please the experimenter and to be a good experimental subject.
The original Schafer and Murphy experiment was conducted under the 
assumption that subjects would not be able to perceive both aspects of the 
ambiguous reversible figures at 1/3 second exposure speed. In,the present 
experiment, subjects were asked in the extended interview, concerning 
their knowledge that the figures fit together and also how often they 
actually did see both profiles together on the test. Of the total of 130 
subjects run in the experiment, only. 14 could not match up the correct faces 
which fit together when asked to do so in the extended interview. Six of 
the 14 were in the control group. All of the remaining 116 (or 89.2 per­
cent) subjects answered "yes" to the question: "Did you ever notice or 
suspect that there were two profiles inside the circle on the test, de­
pending upon which way you looked at it?" and then went on to correctly 
match up the profiles. Some of these subjects only suspected that there 
might be two profiles together, but never really saw two together clearly. 
Table 12 shows the frequency distribution of subjects ratings on a five- 
point scale concerning their certainty that two profiles were present. 
Notice that 59.2 percent of them were absolutely certain that two profiles 
fit together on the test.
Table 12 also shows the data for the question: "The faces which 
always won money during learning were?" and the frequencies of certainty 
ratings for this question. Control subjects did not answer this question 
so the total N is 106. Notice that 82.9 percent did learn which profiles 
always won money and could correctly recall them after an interval of 60 
test trials on which no winning and losing took place. Most (72.6 per­
cent of the total N) were entirely certain of this.
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Table 12
Frequency Distribution of Subjects Ratings of Certainty 
That Two Profiles Fit on the Test 
and Which Two Profiles Won Money
Frequency
Percent
Frequency
Percent
Certainty of Figures Fitting
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 5 21 77
4.6 5.4 3.9 16.1 59.2
Correct
Total
116
89.2
Incorrect
Total
14
10.8
Total N = 130
Certainty of Winning Figures 
1 2 3 *  4 5
0 1 3 7 77
0 .9 2.8 6.6 72.6
88
82.9
18
17.1
Total N = 106
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When aware_and unaware subjects are compared on relative certainty
that the figures fit on the test (Table 13), there is a significantly
2
greater proportion (X = 8.78, df = 1, .01) of awares who were certain
of this contingency. Also, comparing awares and unawares on certainty of
the figures which won money (Table 14) shows that there is a significantly 
2
(X = 15.02, df = 1, P<.001) higher proportion of awares who were com­
pletely certain of the winners. It appears that subjects who knew which 
profiles won and were relatively certain that a winner and a loser appeared 
together on the test were more likely to become aware.
The above analysis does not take into account the frequency of 
subjects who actually saw two profiles together on the test. A subject 
could know or suspect that two profiles were being presented, yet one of 
them could be dominant at the 1/3 second exposure speed. The subject would 
then be reporting only one name because he actually only saw one profile. 
The extended interview contained a question which helps evaluate this, 
possibility. Subjects were asked to circle one of five alternatives with 
regard to the number of times they actually saw two profiles together on 
the test. The alternatives were; (1) never, (2) a few times, (3) several 
times, (4) often, and (5) always. The most reasonable place to partition 
these ratings into a saw few-saw many dichotomy seems to be between 
ratings two and three. Table 15 shows that a significantly greater pro­
portion of awares (X^ = 9.7, df = 1, P^.Ol) claimed to have seen two 
profiles together on the test. It appears reasonable to assume that 
subjects who often saw two profiles had to make a decision as to which 
name to report. It may be that having to make this decision facilitated 
awareness.
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Table 13
Frequency of 39 Aware and 38 Unaware Subjects Classified 
According to Relative Certainty or Uncertainty 
That Figures Fit
Aware Unaware Totals
Certain
4-5 Ratings
Uncertain
1-3 Ratings 
and Mistaken 
Identification
Totals
.2
(X 8.76, df = 1, .01)
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Table 14
Frequency of 39 Aware and 38 Unaware Subjects Classified According- 
to Relative Certainty or Uncertainty of the Two Profiles 
Which Always Won Money
Aware Unaware Totals
Certain 
5 Ratings 0nly 35 19 54
Uncertain 
1-4 Ratings 
and Mistaken 
Identifications
4 19 23
Totals 39 38 77
(X = 15.02, df = 1, P.6.001)
Table 15
Frequency of 39 Aware and 38 Unaware Subjects Classified According 
to Whether They Actually Saw Two Profiles Together on the Test
a Few or Many Times
s
Aware Unaware Totals
Saw Few 9 22 31
Saw Many 30 16 46
Totals 39 38 77
(X^ = 9.7, df = 1, PC.Ol)
. 6 7
Data was collected with regard to another factor which could 
possibly be related to the Schafer-Murphy effect. Subjects may have;, 
reported more winning profiles on the test because they expected that 
they would win more money by.doing so. On the extended interview, sub­
jects were asked if they had at first expected to continue winning money
on the test. Table 16 shows that there was no association between behavior
2
on the test and expectancy of winning more money (X = .009, df = 1, NS).
It could be that awareness is related to the expectancy of. re­
ceiving more reward on the test. However, Table 17 reveals no significant
2
association between awareness and this expectancy (X = 1.28, df = 1, NS).
In Table 18 it is interesting to note that there is a significant relation 
2
(X = 4.57, df = 1, P^.05) between the expectancy of more money and co­
opérât ion-noncooperation when only awares are considered. By inspection 
of the table, we see that this is due to nine out of ten of the nonco­
operators not expecting more money on the test. This could be a clue to
the noncooperating group having a negative attitude toward the experiment, 
althouth there Is no way of investigating this possibility.
Subjects Who Reported Both. Recall from Chapter 3 that ten sub­
jects were eliminated from the main analysis because they consistently 
called the names of both profiles in the ambiguous test situation. All 
of these subjects reported that they always saw both profiles together 
on the test when asked about this on the extended interview. However,
67 other subjects also reported being certain of seeing both profiles on 
the test yet they responded as instructed with the name of only one. Pfe- 
vious studies do not report difficulty with subjects reporting both names 
on the test. For this reason, data from these ten deviant subjects were 
examined more closely. All ten of these subjects were unaware. Under the
\
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Table 16
Frequency of 96 Subjects Who Scored Above and Below 50 Percent 
Rewarded Responses Classified According to Whether or not 
They Expected to Win More Money on the Test
Expectancy
Yes No Totals
Above 50 Percent 26 30 56
50 Percent or Below 18 22 40
Totals 44 5-2 96
(X = .009, df = 1, MS)
Table 17
Frequency of 39 Aware and 38 Unaware Subjects Classified According 
to Expectancy of Winning More Money on the Test
Expectancy 
Yes No
(X = 1.28, df = 1, NS)
Totals
Aware 15 ' 24 39
Unaware 10 28 38
Totals 25 52 77
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Table 18
Frequency of 29 Cooperating and 10 Noncooperating Awares Classified 
According to Expectancy of Winning More Money on the Test
Expectancy
Cooperate
Noncooperate
Totals
Yes No Totals
14 15 29
1 9 10
15 24 39
(X^ = 4.57, df = 1, P6.05)
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hypothesis that the population probability of a subject being aware is .50, 
which is reasonable from the present data (A=39, UA=38), the binomial pro­
bability of all ten of these subjects being unaware is .001 (Walker & Lev, 
1953). Therefore, it seems unlikely that "both-saying" subjects were 
unaware by chance. Also, nine of the ten subjects were from the naive 
subject population. Under the hypothesis that the probability of a 
"both-saying" subject being drawn from either population is .50, the 
binomial probability of a nine-one split is .022. Accordingly, it seems 
unlikely that these subjects came from the naive group by chance.
Among the 96 experimental subjects retained in the analysis, only 
seven match the description of the nine naive subjects described above, 
that is, having always seen both, being unaware and naive. Therefore, 
out of this specific sub-population, "both-saying" was not uncommon, in 
fact it occurred more than 50 percent of the time. For the other 89 sub­
jects, it occurred only once. If previous experimenters did not draw a 
sample from the population of naive unawares with superior visual acuity, 
then it is not surprising that they did not encounter the "both-saying" 
problem.
CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
The Present Findings 
Recall from Chapter 2, the general objectives of this disserta­
tion; first, to test the hypothesis that the Schafer-Murphy effect would 
be found to a greater degree using a psychologically sophisticated group 
of subjects than with a comparable sample of psychologically naive subjects; 
second, to test the hypothesis that the Schafer-Murphy effect could be ac­
counted for by a subgroup of subjects who were aware of the experimenter's 
hypothesis and who were cooperating in their responses, Strong support 
for both of these predictions was obtained in the experimental results.
The data are clear: subjects who think that the experimenter expects them
to pick previously rewarded profiles comply with these expectancies in the 
majority of cases. Also, the probability that a subject will correctly 
perceive the experimenter's purposes is significantly increased if he has 
at least an elementary knowledge of the field of psychology.
Subjects who were not aware of the experimenter's hypothesis 
varied considerably in their behavior on the test. Some consistently 
reported the names of both profiles. Others developed directional sets, 
that is, consistently nanling the profile on the right or left. Some others 
reported alternating with one name and then the other. Those unawares 
with less than average visual acuity had no problem in deciding which name
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to call as they apparently saw only one profile. This variability 
balanced out over a large sample of unaware subjects so that there was 
no more tendency to report previously rewarded profiles than there was 
to report the punished ones.
Some subjects were difficult to classify with regard to awareness. 
They seemed to know quite a bit about the purpose of the experiment but 
they thought that the experimenter could be interested in discovering 
which profiles, either thé .'rewarded or the punished, would be dominant 
in perception. These subjects apparently were not operating under the 
demand to.report rewarded profiles. Among these subjects, some went on 
to report that while they thought the experimenter could expect either 
one, he probably expected the rewarded profiles to be dominant. Most 
of these latter subjects were among the 19 on which the judges could 
not agree as to whether they were aware or not. The former subjects, 
who reported only that either one could have been expected, were classi­
fied as unaware. Other subjects (N = 3) reported that they thought the 
experimenter expected punished profiles to be emphasized in perception. 
Interestingly, all of these had percent rewarded response scores below 
50 percent.
The finding of a significant difference between psychologically 
naive and sophisticated samples is particularly interesting. In fact, 
the naive sample in the present study, while containing some aware co­
operating subjects, did not differ significantly from the control group.
Not only did these groups differ in the behavior measured in the experiment, 
but they differed in other ways. Nine of them did not conform to the in­
structions to report only one profile on the test. Many of them asked 
questions such as: "What is this experiment about?" and seemed amused
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or embarrassed by the reward and punishment procedure. The sophisticated 
subjects, on the other hand, typically did not ask questions and followed 
instructions without hesitation.
The naive aware subjects did not have the psychological language 
for describing their awareness. They frequently referred to the experiment 
as a "test,” and used such terms as "Bertrand was a good guy while Nathan 
was the bad guy," or "Good ole Bertrand won me money," etc. The sophis­
ticated aware subjects gave qualitatively different post-experimental 
reports. They used words like: "hypothesis," "reinforced stimulus," "re­
ward and punishment," "conditioning," "perception," and "I chose the profiles 
on which I had received reinforcement." Obviously, subjects who have had a 
course in psychology do learn something. Yet, 90 percent of the data in 
psychology is collected on subjects taking a course in psychology.
Use Of Post-Experimental Interviews ^
The present research was conducted under the assumption that at 
the present level of development of psychology, even a rough index of 
something psychologically meaningful can have value while something pre­
cisely operationalized and formulated in mathematical language can be 
based on a behavior that is an artifact of an experimental situation which 
has no parallel outside the experimental setting and therefore may be worth­
less (Heider, 1958).
It was further assumed that the best method of finding out what 
subjects think about during a controlled experimental session is the most 
obvious way, that is, to ask them afterwards in a way that lets them under­
stand that you really want to know and that you expect them to be honest. 
Some psychologists have hesitated to accept such an approach for fear that
J
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there is too much slippage between what subjects are able to verbalize at 
a later point in time and the actual cognitions they might have had. There 
is, admittedly, some slippage in the method of post-experimental reports, 
but this does not invalidate their scientific value if they are used with 
reasonable and objective controls. Their scientific value is increased 
when they are put to the test of inter-scientist agreement.
As an illustration of the kinds of post-experimental reports 
given by various kinds of subjects after the experiment, selections from 
some actual protocols are presented below.
In the classical verbal conditioning of meaning (Page, 1964), the 
dependent measure was taken only once, consequently cooperation was mostly 
all or none. In th^ present study, the dependent measure was taken a total 
of 30 times, and some subjects claimed to cooperate for awhile and then to 
pick losers for awhile. The following quote from a male subject in Group 
IV illustrates the reports of a partial cooperator.
(Question one. Purpose of the experiment?^ To see if 
reinforcement effects perceptual learning. The reinforcement 
in the preliminary learning session appeared, at least to me, 
to prompt almost automatically, the reinforced response when 
the actual test began. (Question three. Purpose of putting 
the profiles inside a complete circle.) To see which facë I, 
the subject, would pick out, i.e., perceive. (Question four.
On the test the experimenter expected) the faces of Bertrand and 
Clifford, the reinforced responses. These responses were rein­
forced. Therefore, it can only be expected^that these would 
turn up. One would also expect the "punished" responses to 
turn up less often. (Question 18. Make any additional state­
ments, which apply to your behavior on the test.) I tried to 
cooperate for awhile, then I decided to be a little mischevious 
by picking out a losing face now and then.
This subject was a junior and had completed nine undergraduate hours in
psychology. He was aware and cooperating, but not always. His percent
rewarded response score was 67.
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Some aware subjects claimed to have cooperated almost completely. 
This was not confined to the sophisticated group, though there were more 
of them in that group. To illustrate these points, the following quote is 
from a male sophomore who had not previously taken a course in psychology. 
He reported 100 percent rewarded profiles on the test.
(Question one. Purpose of the experiment.) To try to 
see whether or not learning can be induced by rewarding a 
person for his responsiveness. Also, to see whether or not 
the person would see the faces that meant money to him.
(Question three. Purpose of putting the profiles inside a 
complete circle.) The two faces in the circle were one which 
would lose money and one which would win. The subject would 
be tested to see if he identified the pictures that would win 
for him. (Question four. On the test, the experimenter ex­
pected) faces that made me money. This would determine whether 
or not earning money was a stimulus to learning. (Question 18.
Make any additional statements which apply to your behavior on 
the test.) I knew, because of the training period, that 
Bertrand and Nathan and Clifford and Duncan went together be­
cause of the lip-like appearances on the profiles. Therefore,
I answered with the winning profiles.
To complete the illustrations of subjects answers to thé extended 
interview questions, the protocol below was given by the male junior who 
had no previous hours in psychology and was classified as unaware.
(Question one. Purpose of the experiment.) During the 
first part of the experiment I had little idea of what I was 
doing. The second part showed me that my mind could not react 
instantly to all of the things it saw, and neither could it 
remember them all. I guess I thought the purpose of the ex­
periment was to see how much the mind could register and how 
much it could remember to answer correctly. (Question three. - -
Purpose of putting the profiles inside a complete circle.)
This, I believe, was to see if when the profile waS within a 
complete circle the subject would tend to try to see two pro­
files or just see the ones he had been seeing during the 
experiment. (Question four. On the test, the experimenter 
expected) I believe that the experimenter wanted me to see one 
of the profiles I had seen during the experiment and to pick 
out the ones I had not yet seen. ^The experimenter probably 
expected that I would see many new profiles as the profiles 
with the complete circle around 'them created many new pro­
files. (Notice that he doesn't seem to know that there are 
two of the previously learned profiles within the circle.
This subject was one of the 14 who could not correctly match
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up the profiles which fit on question 12) (Question 18.
Make any additional statements with regard to your behavior 
on the test.) I wasn't really sure of how to react at times.
On such a test, it is easy to miss, as all these profiles 
start to look alike. It is a very hard test, I believe, but 
I enjoyed doing it.
While it wasn't possible to obtain precise interval scale mea­
surement of the subjects' awarenesses or response hypotheses, study of 
their reports makes it abundantly clear that what the subjects thought 
about during the experiment were powerful determinants of behavior. Even 
the rough classifications of aware-unaware and cooperate-not cooperate ac­
counted for all of the systematic variance in the experiment,
y'
Interpretation Of Previous Literature
It now appears reasonable to suggest that past reports of 
modifying perception by the use of small amounts of money contiguously 
with training on certain of the stimuli were probably produced by aware 
and cooperating subjects. It seems that past experimenters were modify­
ing verbal reports in their testing situation, but the underlying 
psychological processes involved may well have been quite unrelated to 
these experimenter's interpretations of the behavior. Small amounts of 
money given and taken away do not seem to modify what is seen when an 
ambiguous figure is perceived. What is reported as seen is, however, 
modified under the special circumstance where the subject thinks that 
the experimenter expects that he will be able to see those figures better 
for which he has received money.
In the present experiment, it was observed that unaware subjects 
were not always consistent in their strategies for choosing one profile 
over the other throughout the test. Some aware subjects tired of co­
operating consistently over 30 trials, while others did not become fully
77
aware until toward the end of the test at which time they began cooperat­
ing. Recall that Schafer and Murphy obtained the effect only until about 
the 16th trial at which time some of their subjects reversed their bias 
from rewarded to punished profiles. Their other subjects continued to 
report rewarded profiles. If we assume that some of their subjects were 
aware while others were unaware (or that all were aware), then their loss 
of the effect after 16 trials is hot surprising. It could be that their 
awares continued to cooperate, while their unawares just happened to be 
going predominantly with the rewarded profiles at first. We cannot 
attribute this effect to the rewards, because of the small sample (N =
5). With a larger sample*,, they may have gotten some unawares who would 
have reported the punished profiles. Jackson (1954) did have three sub­
jects in 12 who did not show the effect and three more who gave only a 
slight preference to rewarded profiles. If these were unaware, then they 
did, in fact, balance out. Jackson's other six subjects gave between 75 
and 100 percent rewarded responses and resemble closely the aware coop­
erators in the present study.
Concerning the differences between psychologically naive and 
sophisticated subjects, it is interesting that the only other recorded —  
instance of negative results with the Schafer-Murphy effect occurred when 
a sample of high school students served as subjects (Rock & Fleck, 1950).
It is true that a projector tachistoscope was used and that subjects pro­
bably could not see the stimuli as well. However, Smith and Hochberg 
(1954) also used a projector tachistoscope with significant results. Jackson 
(1954) plays down his results obtained with a projector tachistoscope in an 
effort to explain away Rock and Fleck's negative results on the grounds 
that they used the wrong apparatus. However, Jackson did obtain 59 percent
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rewarded responses summed over 18 subjects. He did get 70 percent re­
warded responses using a Dodge tachistoscope. But, even this might not 
mean that the apparatus produced the difference. In the light of the 
present findings, this difference could be accounted for if Jackson ran
• Î S  • .
his subjects with the projector earlier in the semester.
Schafer and Murphy- (1943) report that they did not get the effect 
in a pilot study, but they got tendencies to develop directional sets.
They then invented their set breaking figures. The five subjects run 
later, using set breaking figures, did show the effect. In the present 
study, the set breaking figures did not appear to work, very well in that 
many unaware subjects developed directional sets. Rock and Fleck (1950) 
formally analyzed the effect of the set breaking figures and found them 
to be ineffective. One can speculate as to the events that might have 
transpired in psychology class between Schafer and Murphy's pilot study 
and the study they report. It could well be that a chapter on learning 
theory was studied. Actually, Schafer and Murphy report that two of 
their subjects were not in a psychology course. These subjects are not 
identified. One of them could have been their control subject. It would 
be interesting if these were the subjects who changed from rewarded to 
punished responses after 16 trials on the test, or were the two subjects 
with the lowest number of rewarded responses.
Solley and Murphy (1960) discuss the literature on reinforcement 
and figure-ground perception in detail. Concerning awareness, they say 
that the effect is best obtained at low levels of awareness. Specifically, 
they say:
Subjects are aware of-the perceptual materials, and of the 
reward and punishment stimuli, but they are rarely aware of the 
connection between the two. -- it appears that maximal autistic
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perception is obtained if the reinforcement or punishment stimuli 
are barely in awareness.
The present results directly contradict this claim. In the present study
it was found that the effect is maximally obtained at very high levels
of awareness. It seems strange that Solley can make any statement about
awareness, because nowhere does he report the results of a formal study
of awarenfess. It may be that Solley's subjects did not report high levels
of awareness simply because he never really asked them what they were aware
of.
While past experimenters have asked a few questions concerning 
subjects' awarenesses in the Schafer-Murphy situation, what was asked 
(or how) is not usually reported. Jackson (1954) asked two questions. 
First, "What was the'purpose of the experiment?" and second, "Were you 
interested in winning the money?" Concerning his first question, it 
has been found, in verbal conditioning studies, that such a question 
does not detect more than half of the aware subjects. Jackson does 
report one subject as saying, "The purpose was probably to get an 
association of winning 15 cents with Nathan and Duncan." This was 
one of Jackson's four extreme responders. It is likely that an extended 
interview similar to that used in the present study would have revealed 
that the other three extreme responders were just as aware. Concerning 
Jackson's other question, he found, "Since it was clear that rewards and 
' punishments were having some effect upon perception," that furthfer
"probing" was necessary. By this, we assume that subjects who had 
initially said that the money didn't make any difference were asked 
again, "OhI Come now, you really did want that money, didn't you?"
It is not surprising that aware cooperating subjects, believing that
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the experimenter must expect that they should have been interested in 
the money, would then acquiesce to such strong social pressure and say, 
"Well, mqybe I did want it a little." This is a clear cut example of 
a demand characteristic.
The criticism that demand characteristics also influenced the 
results of the present post-experimental interview could also be raised. 
However, there are some important differences. First, a specific attempt 
was made in the present experiment to release subjects from any demand 
characteristics by the instructions before the; interview. They were told, 
in effect, that the experimental game that the experimenter had previously 
required them to play was now over and that the task was now to honestly 
report what they had thought about during the game. Second, while the 
interview was extended, it was not at all "probing" in the sense that 
Jackson uses that term. In short, the demands were to tell the truth 
and not what the experimenter might expect to hear. Third, the interview 
was written which eliminated the possibility of the experimenter convey­
ing his expectancies through tone of voice or facial expression. In the 
present situation it would seem that a subject still operating under the 
demands of the "game" would see it as his task not to reveal his awareness 
rather than to "ruin the experiment" by confessing ttiat he knew what it 
was about.
Implications For The Social Psychologv Of Experiments
Psychologists who used experimental procedures such as those 
employed in studies of reward and punishment on perception must have 
been either unaware of or ignoring the large number of possible social 
influence variables present in such a situation. While some of these
81
variables cannot be precisely measured, they cannot be Ignored.
Rosenthal's (1963) experimenter bias, Splelberger's (1962) awareness, 
and the present study's concern with cooperators suggest that these 
are factors that may be mediating behavior In many experiments.
Communication does not require specific explicit verbalization. 
Aside from the logic Implicit In the situation Itself, the experimenter
may communicate much Information concerning his expectancies by tone of
0
voice and gestures (Rosenthal & Fode, 1963). The present experimenter 
has never conducted an experiment where some subjects didn't ask questions 
which required deviation from the planned procedure, yet these are never 
discussed In formal reports of results. The use of deception, when It 
Is not effective, may also Induce In the subject the set to begin trying 
to figure out the experiment. All of these things can communicate to 
an experimental subject the experimenter's expectancies. In the Schafer- 
Murphy situation, the experimenters would have saved time and money had 
they merely told their subjects that they were to "Pick Nathan Instead 
of Bertrand when you see them together." The same Instruction Is ap­
parently communicated by having the subject push money back and forth.
The experimenter Is an authority figure, a "psychologist," and 
usually older than the subject. Because of this, the subject, who knows 
(or thinks he knows) what the experimenter wants of him, may feel strong 
social pressure to conform to his wishes. In any experiment of the type 
described In this dissertation. It seems legitimate to ask whether the 
behavior Is a function of the experimenter's carefully measured Indepen­
dent variables or of the experimenter's wishes. The only alternatives 
are to either Isolate and control for all of these factors or to find 
other methods of studying behavior that are not subject to these problems.
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The finding that there were differences between psychologically 
sophisticated and psychologically naive subjects also has implications 
that go beyond the specific experimental setting in which it occurred.
It seems that subjects who believed they were supposed to be conditioned 
behaved as if they were. Subjects who hadn't studied psychology were less 
likely to have acquired these beliefs. It is a common practice among 
psychologists to use undergraduate psychology students as subjects. In 
the light of the present findings, it is suggested that this practice 
should be re-evaluated. Psychologists should consider the scientific 
generality of data supporting their theories, when that data has been 
obtained from people already trained to believe that these theories are 
true.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY A
In recent years, two related problem areas have arisen. The first 
has been concerned with the problem of awareness in verbal conditioning 
experiments. The second concerns the problem of demand characteristics 
in psychological experiments and more generally the social psychology of 
the psychological experiment. The present study points out that these 
two problems are actually concerned with the same psychological phenomena. 
The former is merely a special experimental example of the latter more 
general problem.
The specific research problem was concerned with the well known 
Schafer-Murphy effect of reward and punishment on figure-ground percep­
tion. It was proposed that the experimental effect was an artifact of 
demand characteristics, or of subjects becoming aware of the experimenter's 
hypothesis. This possibility was investigated using 96 experimental sub­
jects who responded to extended post-experimental interviews concerned 
with awareness of the purpose of the experiment. Pilot research sug­
gested the hypothesis that psychological sophistication of subjects might- 
be related to a tendency to report rewarded profiles, because of greater 
occurrence of aware subjects in this population.
Strong support was obtained for both hypotheses. Many subjects 
reported that they actually saw both of the profiles in the reversible
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figure-ground situation and had to make, a decision as to which name to re­
port. Of these, more than half reported that they thought the experimenter 
expected them to report rewarded names. The Schafer-Murphy effect was ac­
counted for by a subgroup of highly aware subjects who respond consistently 
with the names of previously rewarded profiles in the ambiguous figure- 
ground test. Unaware subjects showed no more tendency to report rewarded 
than punished profile names. There was a significant difference between 
a group of^ psychologically naive subjects. (N = 48) who were just beginning 
a course in introductory psychology and a group of psychologically sophis­
ticated subjects (N = 48) who had completed such a course the previous * 
semester or the previous year. Only in the latter group was a replication 
obtained. General sophistication factors such as college classification 
and age were not significant, suggesting that the difference between 
groups was due to the specific factor of knowledge of the field of 
psychology.
The finding of a relationship between awareness of the purpose of 
the experiment and the Schafer-Murphy effect was discussed in terms of 
social psychological factors typically ignored in laboratory experiments. 
In line with the finding of differences between psychologically naive 
and sophisticated subjects, it was suggested that psychologists re­
examine the common practice of teaching their theories to students and 
then testing these theories using the same people as subjects.
t
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APPENDIX A
EXTENDED INTERVIEWS
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s EXAMPLEfOF THE EXTENDED INTERVIEW
(Experimental Group)
(1) The purpose of this experiment was:
(2) The purpose of winning and losing money was;
(3) The purpose of putting the profiles inside a complete circle on the test
was ;
(4) On the test, the experimenter expected that 1 would see:
Please explain your answer to question 4.
(5) The faces which always won money during learning were:
Circle two; (If you don't know, guess.)
Nathan, Bertrand, Clifford, Duncan
(6) How certain are you of your answer to question 5? (Mark and X on the
line of the rating scale which best describes your certainty.)
complete guess ___          certain
(7) Were you interested in winning the money? Circle one: yes, no 
(Mark an X on the line of the rating scale which best describes your true 
feelings about the money.)
not at all ___        wanted it- quite a bit
(8) During the test, did it ever occur to you that the experimenter might
expect that you would see more winning profiles than losing profiles?
Circle one; yes, no. Explain; In other words, what did you think
about the purpose of the test?
(9) How certain are you that you had this idea? (Mark an X on one line.) 
uncertain _____        certain
(10) Did you ever notice or suspect that there were two profiles inside 
the circle on the test, depending upon which way you looked at it?
Circle one; yes, no.
(11) If so, how certain: were you of this? (Mark an X on one line.) 
uncertain certain
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(12) If so, draw lines connecting the profiles that fit together. If 
uncertain, guess. Nathan Nathan
Bertrand Bertrand
Clifford Clifford
Duncan Duncan
(13) If you ever saw two profiles together on the test, what was the 
basis of your answer? In other words, why did you report one or the 
other names instead of reporting that you saw both? Explain;
(14) How often did you see two profiles together on the test?
Circle ones never, a few times, several times, often, always
(15) In this experiment, two profiles always won and two always lost in
the training phase. In the test phase, two profiles always appeared to­
gether in the circles. One was a winning profile and the other a losing 
profile. It was expected that you would more often see the winning 
profile. Did something like this occur to you during the test?
Circle ones yes, no. How certain are you of your answer to number 15?
(Mark X on one line.) uncertain    ___  __   certain
(16) At first, on the test, did you think that you might win' more money if
you identified the winning faces or something similar?
Circle ones yes, no. Explains In other words, what did you think
about at the first of the test?
(17) Mark an X by any of the following statements that applies approxi­
mately to you. You may mark as many as you wish.
  I had no idea of what the experiment was about during the test.
  I thought I knew what the experiment was about, but my idea was not
similar to that stated in number 15.
  I knew approximately what the experiment was about on the test and
when there was any doubt as to which face I saw in the circle, I reported 
a winning face. .
 r  knew approximately what the experiment was about on the test, but
I called them the way I saw them. If I saw both, I either said both or X. 
W h i c h ? ________
  I knew what the experiment was about, but I tried to resist being in­
fluenced, If anything, I reported more losing than winning faces on the 
test.’
_ When there were two faces in the circle, I always gave the name of the 
one on the right or left (circle one) and did not pay any attention to 
the winning or losing part of it,
  The winning faces really did stand out more clearly than the losing ones,
It was hard to decide which stood out.
   I sometimes noticed both profiles, but I didn't know if I was supposed
to report both.
  I deliberately tried to cooperate, in that while knowing that two faces
were present, I reported the winning face because I thought that was what 
I was supposed to do. %
   I think I saw the winning faces more often because I was looking for
them.
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■ I noticed that Nathan and Bertrand could be seen together but I 
didn't notice Clifford and Duncan.
   I noticed that Clifford and Duncan could be seen together but I
didn't notice Nathan and Bertrand.
(18) Make any additional statements, not Included above, which apply to 
your behavior on the test.
(Control Group)
(1) The purpose of this experiment was:
(2) The purpose of putting the profiles Inside a complete circle on the 
test was;
(3) On the test, the experimenter expected that I would see:
Please explain your answer to question 3.
(4) Did you ever notice or suspect that there were two profiles Inside 
the circle on the test, depending upon which way you looked at It?
Circle one: yes, no.
(5) If so, how certain were you of this? (Mark an X on one line.) 
uncertain ___         certain
(6) If so, draw lines connecting the profiles that fit together, If 
uncertain, guess. Nathan Nathan
Bertrand Bertrand
Clifford Clifford
Duncan Duncan
(7) If you ever saw two profiles together on the test, what was the basis 
of your answer? In other words, why did you report one,or the other names 
Instead of reporting that you saw both? Explain:
(8) How often did you see two profiles together on the test?
Circle one; never, a few times, several times, often, always
